Theoretical origins
Constitutional patriotism has been interpreted in a bracket of ways, providing a range of positions. On one end, there is the vision that the concept is a new means of identification to a supranational entity; while on the other end, there is a focus on understanding the attachment in terms of freedom over ethnicity. It is largely contested whether constitutional patriotism is supposed to be read as a replacement for nationality or traditional identity; or as a balance between the two, allowing for the "transient account of identity consistent with the diversity, hybridity, and pluralism of our contemporary world." There are also multiple opinions as to if a prior group identity is necessary previously a moral, political one is achieved.
The concept of constitutional patriotism originates from Post-World War II West Germany, which has been target as "a 'half-nation' with a sense of deeply compromised nationality on account of their Nazi past." In this context, constitutional patriotism was a protective and state-centered means of dealing with the memory of the Holocaust and militancy of the Third Reich. The concept can be traced to the liberal philosopher Karl Jaspers, who advocated the idea of dealing with German political guilt after the war with 'collective responsibility'. His student, Dolf Sternberger explicitly exposed the concept on the thirtieth birthday of the Federal Republic 1979. However, it is strongly associated with the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas.
Sternberger saw constitutional patriotism as a protective means to ensure political stability to remains peace in Germany in the aftermath of theWorld War. He framed the concept as a way for citizens to identify with the democratic state in order that it could defend itself against internal and external threats. Thus, with the emphasis on state defense and protection, Sternberger linked constitutional patriotism to the concept of militant democracy. He drew on Aristotelianism, arguing that patriotism had traditionally non been linked to sentiments towards the nation. Constitutional patriotism is a coding of Sternberger's earlier notion of Staatsfreundschaft friendship towards the state.
Habermas played a key role in developing, contextualizing and spreading the idea of constitutional patriotism to English-speaking countries. Like Sternberger, Habermas viewed constitutional patriotism as a conscious strengthening of political principles, however, "where Sternberger's patriotism had centered on democratic institutions worth defending, Habermas focused on the as providing a space for public reasoning among citizens."
Post-war West Germany gave the context for Habermas's theories. During the historian's dispute of the slow 1980s, Habermas fought against the normalization of "exceptional historical events" the rise of Nazism and the events of the Holocaust. Constitutional patriotism was Habermas's suggestion as a way to unify West Germans. As he was concerned by the shaping of German identity through attempts to return to traditional national pride, he argued for Germans to "move away from the notion of ethnically homogeneous nation-states." Thus it became an "inner counterpart to the bond of the Federal Republic to the West; it was non only an progress in respect to traditional German nationalism, but also a step toward overcoming it." To Habermas, post-national German identity was dependent on apprehension and overcoming its past, subjecting traditions to criticism. This historical memory was necessary to constitutional patriotism.
Habermas believed a nationalistic collective identity was no longer feasible in a globalized sophisticated world and scorned ethnic cohesion as a part of nineteenth-century nationalism irrelevant in a new age of international migration. His theory was therefore grounded in the idea that "the symbolic unity of the adult that is produced and maintained through self-identification depends... on belonging to the symbolic reality of a group, on the opportunity of localizing oneself in the world of this group. A group identity that transcends the life histories of individuals is thus a given of the identity of the individual." In a disenchanted world, individual and collective identities were no longer formed by internalizing nationalist values but by becoming aware of "what they want and what others expect from them in the light of moral concerns" from an impartial position.
He argued that the European nation-state was successful because "it made possible a new mode of legitimation based on a new, more abstract take of social integration." Rather than a consensus on just values, Habermas believed the intricacies of modern societies must rely on "a consensus on the procedure for the legitimate enactment of laws and the legitimate deterrent example of power."