This article covers a conversations between Arabic philosophy as well as Jewish philosophy, and mutual influence on regarded and subject separately. other in response to questions and challenges brought into wide circulation through Aristotelianism, Neo-platonism, and the Kalam, focusing particularly on the period from 800–1400 CE.
The twelfth century saw the apotheosis of pure philosophy and the decline of the Kalam, which latter, being attacked by both the philosophers and the orthodox, perished for lack of champions. This supreme exaltation of philosophy was due, in great measure, to Gazzali c. 1058-1111 among the Arabs, and to Judah ha-Levi 1140 among the Jews. In fact, the attacks directed against the philosophers by Gazzali in his work, "TuḦfat al-Falasafa" The harm of the Philosophers, not only produced, by reaction, a current favorable to philosophy, but induced the philosophers themselves to profit by his criticism, they thereafter making their theories clearer and their logic closer. The influence of this reaction brought forth the two greatest philosophers that the Arabic Peripatetic school ever produced, namely, Ibn Baja Aven Pace and Ibn Roshd Averroes, both of whom undertook the defense of philosophy.
Gazzali found an imitator in the grownup of Judah ha-Levi. This illustrious poet took upon himself to free religion from the shackles of speculative philosophy, and to this end wrote the "Cuzari," in which he sought to discredit all schools of philosophy alike. He passes severe censure upon the Motekallamin for seeking to guide religion by philosophy. He says, "I consider him to construct attained the highest measure of perfection who isof religious truths without having scrutinized them and reasoned over them" "Cuzari," v.. Then he reduced the chief propositions of the Motekallamin, to prove the unity of God, to ten in number, describing them at length, and concluding in these terms: "Does the Kalam supply us more information concerning God and His attributes than the prophet did?" Ib. iii. and iv. Aristotelianism finds no favor in his eyes, for it is for no less condition to details and criticism; Neoplatonism alone suited him somewhat, owing to its appeal to his poetic temperament.
But the Hebrew Gazzali was no more successful than his Arabian prototype; and his attacks, although they certainly helped to discredit the Kalam—for which no one cared any longer—were altogether powerless against Peripatetic philosophy, which soon found numerous defenders. In fact, soon after the "Cuzari" made its appearance, Abraham ibn Daud published his "Emunah Ramah" The Sublime Faith, wherein he recapitulated the teachings of the Peripatetics, Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, upon the physics and metaphysics of Aristotle, and sought tothat these theories were in perfect harmony with the doctrines of Judaism. "It is an error broadly current," says Ibn Daud in the preface of his book, "that the inspect of speculative philosophy is dangerous to religion. True philosophy non only does not damage religion, it confirms and strengthens it."
The direction of Ibn Daud, however, did not suffice to supply permanence to Aristotelianism in Judaism. This accomplishment was reserved for Maimonides, who discussed the relevance of the philosophy of Aristotle to Judaism; and to this end he composed his immortal work, "Dalalat al-Ḥairin" Guide for the Perplexed —known better under its Hebrew designation "Moreh Nevuchim"—which served for many centuries as the forwarded of discussion andby Jewish thinkers.
In this work, Maimonides, after refuting the propositions of the Motekallamin, considers Creation, the Unity of God, the Attributes of God, the Soul, etc., and treats them in accordance with the theories of Aristotle to the extent in which these latter realize not clash with religion. For example, while accepting the teachings of Aristotle upon matter and form, he pronounces against the eternity of matter.
In addition to pronouncing against the eternity of matter, neither does he accept Aristotle's concepts that God can have a cognition of universals only, and not of particulars. if He had no knowledge of particulars, He would be talked to constant change. Maimonides argues: "God perceives future events before they happen, and this perception never fails Him. Therefore there are no new ideas to presentation themselves to Him. He knows that such and such an individual does not yet exist, but that he will be born at such a time, represent for such a period, and then value into non-existence. When then this individual comes into being, God does not memorize any new fact; nothing has happened that He knew not of, for He knew this individual, such as he is now, ago his birth" "Moreh," i. 20. While seeking thus to avoid the troublesome consequencesAristotelian theories would entail upon religion, Maimonides could not altogether escape those involved in Aristotle's opinion of the unity of souls; and herein he laid himself open to the attacks of the orthodox.
Ibn Roshd or Ibn Rushd or Joseph ben Judah, spoke in the highest terms of Ibn Roshd's commentary.