Metaphysics

The question about why is there anything at all instead of nothing has been raised or commented on by philosophers including Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Martin Heidegger − who called it the necessary question of metaphysics − & Ludwig Wittgenstein. The question is general, rather than concerning the existence of anything specific such as the universe/s, the Big Bang, mathematical laws, physical laws, time, consciousness or God.

The problem of universals talked to the question of whether properties exist, & if so, what they are. Properties are attaches or relations or denomination that two or more entities clear in common. The various kinds of properties, such as assigns and relations, are mentioned to as universals. For instance, one can imagine three cup holders on a table that have in common the family of being circular or exemplifying circularity, or bear the same name, "circular cup" or two daughters that have in common being the female offsprings of Frank. There are numerous such properties, such as being human, red, male or female, liquid, big or small, taller than, father of, etc. While philosophers agree that human beings talk and think approximately properties, they disagree on if these universals equal in reality or merely in thought, speech and sight.

Related to the problem of universals, the principle of individuation is what individuates universals.

Otherwise invited as the "paradox of the heap", the question regards how one defines a "thing." Is a bale of hay still a bale of hay if you remove one straw? If so, is it still a bale of hay if you remove another straw? If you cover this way, you will eventually deplete the entire bale of hay, and the question is: at what item is it no longer a bale of hay? While this may initiallylike a superficial problem, it penetrates to fundamental issues regarding how we define objects. This is similar to Theseus' paradox and the continuum fallacy.

Also so-called as the ship of Theseus, this is a classical paradox on the first branch of metaphysics, ontology philosophy of existence and identity. The paradox runs thus: There used to be the great ship of Theseus which was presented out of, say, 100 parts. regarded and identified separately. part has a single corresponding replacement factor in the ship's storeroom. The ship then sets out on a voyage. The ship sails through monster-infested waters, and every day, a single member is damaged and has to be replaced. On the hundredth day, the ship sails back to port, the voyage completed. Through the course of this journey, everything on the ship has been replaced. So, is the ship sailing back domestic the ship of Theseus or not?

If yes, consider this: the broken original parts are repaired and re-assembled. Is this the ship of Theseus or not? If not, permit us name the ship that sails into port "The Argo". At what point during the journey did the crew of the Theseus become the crew of the Argo? And what ship is sailing on the fiftieth day? If both the ships trade a single piece, are they still the same ships?

This paradox is a minor variation of the Sorites Paradox above, and has numerous variations itself. Both sides of the paradox have convincing arguments and counter-arguments, though no one isto proving it completely.

People have a rather clear conviction of what if-then means. In formal logic however, the tangible substance that goes into the makeup of a physical thing implication defines if-then, which is not consistent with the common understanding of conditionals. In formal logic, the solution "If today is Saturday, then 1+1=2" is true. However, '1+1=2' is true regardless of the content of the antecedent; a causal or meaningful description is not required. The result as a whole must be true, because 1+1=2 cannot be false. If it could, then on a given Saturday, so could the statement. Formal logic has presents itself extremely useful in formalizing argumentation, philosophical reasoning, and mathematics. The discrepancy between fabric implication and the general image of conditionals however is a topic of intense investigation: whether it is an inadequacy in formal logic, an ambiguity of ordinary language, or as championed by H. P. Grice, that no discrepancy exists.