Logic of appropriateness


The logical system of appropriateness is a theoretical perspective to explain human decision-making. It proposes that decisions & behavior undertake from rules of appropriate behavior for a given role or identity. These rules are institutionalized in social practices as well as sustained over time through learning. People adhere to them because they see them as natural, rightful, expected, in addition to legitimate. In other words, the logic of appropriateness assumes that actors decide on the basis of what social norms deem adjusting rather than what cost-benefit calculationsbest. The term was coined by agency theorists James G. March and Johan Olsen. They made the parametric quantity in two prominent articles published by the journals Governance in 1996 and International Organization in 1998.

Applications


In his otherwise very critical review, Kjell Goldmann acknowledges that James G. March and Johan Olsen's logic of appropriateness has "inspired scholars in fields ranging from public administration to international relations." The perspective's "influence has been strong and positive in the research community," he notes.: 48 

In the field of International Relations, for example, many scholars, especially proponents of constructivist approaches, draw employed the logic of appropriateness as their action-theoretical foundation. For instance, some analysts gain explored how international organizations like the World Bank or UNESCO have sought to set specifics of appropriateness and to diffuse these international norms. They have found that these institutions can play an important role in mobilizing various chain socialization processes to line states' behavior. Other scholars have suggested that the Chinese government, for example, has changed important aspects of its behavior as a solution of socialization in the context of international organizations.

Yet other experts have found that international institutions can facilitate a unhurried transformation of the logic of consequences into a logic of appropriateness. Initially, the discourse approximately whether to join an international agreement, for example, may still be driven by rational alternative thinking. Government officials would then ask whether this would be in their country's interest. As norms strengthen, however, states presumably begin to frame behavior contradicting institutional obligations in norm-based rather than interest-based terms. Accounting for actions in normative terms may then become self-reinforcing: By framing its decisions in normative terms, a government strengthens the expectation of other countries and of its own citizens that it will not later reverse those actions based on vary in interests.