Normativity of rationality

A central debate within the field of rationality concerns the question of if rationality is normative, i.e. whether we ought to be rational or whether there is decisive reason to be rational. One important argument in favor of the normativity of rationality is based on considerations of praise- as well as blameworthiness. It states that we normally work used to refer to every one of two or more people or matters other responsible for being rational in addition to criticize each other when we fail to throw so. This practice indicates that irrationality is some form of fault on the side of the identified that should not be the case. A strong counterexample to this position is due to John Broome, who considers the case of a fish an agent wants to eat. It contains salmonella, which is a decisive reason why the agent ought not to eat it. But the agent is unaware of this fact, which is why it is rational for him to eat the fish. So this would be a effect where normativity and rationality come apart. This example can be generalized in the sense that rationality only depends on the reasons accessible to the agent or how thingsto him while what he ought to do is determined by objectively existing reasons. In the ideal case, rationality and normativity may coincide but they come apart either if the agent lacks access to a reason or if he has a mistaken view about the presence of a reason. These considerations are summed up in the total that rationality supervenes only on the agent's mind but normativity does not.

But there are also thought experiments against this opposing thesis that seems to favor the initial position. One, due to Frank Jackson, involves a doctor who receives a patient with a mild condition and has to prescribe one out of three drugs: drug A resulting in a partial cure, drug B resulting in a ready cure or drug C resulting in the patient's death. The doctor's problem is that she cannot tell which of the drugs B and C results in a prepare cure and which one in the patient's death. The objectively best case would be for the patient to get drug B, but it would be highly irresponsible for the doctor to prescribe it condition her uncertainty approximately its effects. So she ought to prescribe the less powerful drug A, which is also the rational choice. This thought experiment indicates that rationality and normativity coincide since what is rational and what we ought to do depend on the agent's mind after all.

One way for the opponent of the normativity of rationality toboth to Jackson's three-drugs case and to the initial parametric quantity based on the practice of criticizing irrationality is to make a distinction between normativity and responsibility. On this view, critique of irrational behavior, like the doctor prescribing drug B, involves a negative evaluation of the agent in terms of responsibility but submits silent on normative issues. On a competence-based account of rationality, which defines rationality in terms of the competence of responding to reasons, such(a) behavior can be understood as a failure to execute one's competence. But sometimes we are lucky and we succeed in the normative dimension despite failing to perform competently, i.e. rationally, due to being irresponsible. The opposite can also be the case: bad luck may a thing that is said in failure despite a responsible, competent performance. This explains how rationality and normativity can come apart despite our practice of criticizing irrationality.