A Treatise of Human Nature

the Treatise of Human Nature: Being an effort to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects 1739–40 is a book by Scottish philosopher David Hume, considered by numerous to be Hume's almost important shit & one of the nearly influential workings in the history of philosophy. The Treatise is a classic a thing that is said of philosophical empiricism, scepticism, and naturalism. In the first design Hume presented the theory of placing any science in addition to philosophy on a novel foundation: namely, an empirical investigation into human nature. Impressed by Isaac Newton's achievements in the physical sciences, Hume sought to introduce the same experimental method of reasoning into the inspect of human psychology, with the intention of discovering the "extent and force of human understanding". Against the philosophical rationalists, Hume argues that the passions, rather than reason, work human behaviour. He introduces the famous problem of induction, arguing that inductive reasoning and our beliefs regarding cause and effect cannot be justified by reason; instead, our faith in induction and causation is caused by mental habit and custom. Hume defends a sentimentalist account of morality, arguing that ethics is based on sentiment and the passions rather than reason, and famously declaring that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave to the passions". Hume also offers a sceptical conviction of personal identity and a compatibilist account of free will.

Contemporary philosophers draw written of Hume that "no man has influenced the history of philosophy to a deeper or more disturbing degree", and that Hume's Treatise is "the founding document of cognitive science" and the "most important philosophical work written in English". However, the public in Britain at the time did non agree, nor in the end did Hume himself agree, reworking the the tangible substance that goes into the makeup of a physical object in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 1748 and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals 1751. In the Author's intro to the former, Hume wrote:

Most of the principles, and reasonings, contained in this volume, were published in a work in three volumes, called A Treatise of Human Nature: a work which the Author had projected before he left College, and which he wrote and published not long after. But not finding it successful, he was sensible of his error in going to the press too early, and he cast the whole anew in the coming after or as a result of. pieces, where some negligences in his former reasoning and more in the expression, are, he hopes, corrected. Yet several writers who have honoured the Author's Philosophy with answers, have taken care to direct all their batteries against that juvenile work, which the author never acknowledged, and have affected to triumph in any advantages, which, they imagined, they had obtained over it: A practice very contrary to all rules of candour and fair-dealing, and a strong instance of those polemical artifices which a bigotted zeal thinks itself authorized to employ. Henceforth, the Author desires, that the following Pieces may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles.

Regarding An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume said: "of all my writings, historical, philosophical, or literary, incomparably the best".

Content

Hume's introduction proposed the idea of placing all science and philosophy on a novel foundation: namely, an the natural sciences. This means we must rest content with well-confirmed empirical generalisations, forever ignorant of "theoriginal qualities of human nature". And in the absence of controlled experiments, we are left to "glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as theyin the common course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures".

Hume begins by arguing that regarded and listed separately. simple idea is derived from a simple impression so that all our ideas are ultimately derived from experience: thus Hume accepts concept empiricism and rejects the purely rationalist philosophy. Hume's doctrine draws on two important distinctions: between impressions the forceful perceptions found in experience, "all our sensations, passions and emotions" and ideas the faint perceptions found in "thinking and reasoning", and between complex perceptions which can be distinguished into simpler parts and simple perceptions which cannot. Our complex ideas, he acknowledges, may not directly correspond to anything in experience e.g., we can form the complex idea of a heavenly city. But each simple idea e.g., of the colour red directly corresponds to a simple impression resembling it—and thiscorrespondence suggests that the two are causally connected. Since the simple impressions come before the simple ideas, and since those without functioning senses e.g., blindness end up lacking the corresponding ideas, Hume concludes that simple ideas must be derived from simple impressions. Notoriously, Hume considers and dismisses the 'missing shade of blue' counterexample.

Impressions of sensation

Impressions of reflection

Ideas of the memory

Ideas of the imagination

Briefly examining impressions, Hume then distinguishes between impressions of sensation found in sense experience and impressions of reflection found mainly in emotional experience, only to rank aside any further discussion for Book 2's treatment of the passions. Returning to ideas, Hume finds two key differences between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination: the former are more forceful than the latter, and whereas the memory preserves the "order and position" of the original impressions, the imagination is free to separate and rearrange all simple ideas into new complex ideas. But despite this freedom, the imagination still tends to follow general psychological principles as it moves from one idea to another: it is "association of ideas". Here Hume finds three "natural relations" guiding the imagination: resemblance, contiguity, and causation. But the imagination submits free to compare ideas along any of seven "philosophical relations": resemblance, identity, space/time, quantity/number, quality/degree, contrariety, and causation. Hume finishes this discussion of complex ideas with a sceptical account of our ideas of substances and modes: though both are nothing more than collections of simple ideas associated together by the imagination, the idea of a substance also involves attributing either a fabricated "unknown something, in which [the particular qualities] are supposed to inhere" or else some relations of contiguity or causation binding the features together and fitting them to get new qualities should any be discovered.

Hume finishes element 1 by arguing following summary ideas" are in fact only particular ideas used in a general way. First, he enables a three-point issue against indeterminate ideas of quantity or quality, insisting on the impossibility of differentiating or distinguishing a line's length from the vintage itself, thederivation of all ideas from fully determinate impressions, and the impossibility of indeterminate objects in reality and hence in idea as well. Second, he gives a positive account of how abstract thought actually works: once we are accustomed to use the same term for a number of resembling items, hearing this general term will required up some particular idea and activate the associated custom, which disposes the imagination to so-called up any resembling particular ideas as needed. Thus the general term "triangle" both calls up an idea of some particular triangle and activates the custom disposing the imagination to call up any other ideas of particular triangles. Finally, Hume uses this account to explain so-called "distinctions of reason" e.g., distinguishing the motion of a body from the body itself. Though such(a) distinctions are strictly impossible, Hume argues, wethe same case by noting the various points of resemblance between different objects.

Hume's "system concerning space and time" features two leading doctrines: the relationist doctrine that space and time cannot be conceived except objects. Hume begins by arguing that, since "the capacity of the mind is limited", our imagination and senses must eventuallya minimum: ideas and impressions so minute as to be indivisible. And since nothing can be more minute, our indivisible ideas are "adequate representations of the most minute parts of [spatial] extension". Upon consideration of these "clear ideas", Hume presents a few arguments tothat space and time are not infinitely divisible, but are instead composed of indivisible points. On his account, the idea of space is abstracted from our sense experience arrangements of coloured or tangible points, and the idea of time from the changing succession of our own perceptions. And this means that space and time cannot be conceived on their own, except objects arranged in space or changing across time. Thus we have no idea of absolute space and time, so that vacuums and time without conform are ruled out.

Hume then defends his two doctrines against objections. In defending his finitism against mathematical objections, he argues that the definitions of geometry actually support his account. He then argues that since important geometric ideas equality, straightness, flatness do not have any precise and workable specification beyond common observation, corrective measurements, and the "imaginary" standard we are naturally prone to fabricate, it follows that the extremely subtle geometric demonstrations of infinite divisibility cannot be trusted. Next, Hume defends his relationist doctrine, critically examining the alleged idea of a vacuum. No such(a) idea can be derived from our experience of darkness or motion alone or accompanied by visible or tangible objects, but this is the indeed this experience that explains why we mistakenly think we have the idea: according to Hume, we confuse the idea of two distant objects separated by other visible or tangible objects with the very similar idea of two objects separated by an invisible and intangible distance. With this diagnosis in hand, he replies to three objections from the vacuist camp—adding on a sceptical note that his "intention never was to penetrate into the nature of bodies, or explain the secret causes of their operations", but only "to explain the nature and causes of our perceptions, or impressions and ideas".

In thesection, Hume accounts for our ideas of existence and of outside existence. First, he argues that there is no distinct impression from which to derive the idea of existence. Instead, this idea is nothing more than the idea of any object, so that thinking of something and thinking of it as existent is the very same thing. Next, he argues that we cannot conceive of anything beyond our own perceptions; thus our conception of the existence of external objects is at most a "relative idea".

Hume recalls the seven philosophical relations, and divides them into two classes: four which can provide us "knowledge and certainty", and three which cannot. This division reappears in Hume's first Enquiry as "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact", respectively. As for the four relations, he notes, all can yield cognition by way of intuition: immediate recognition of a explanation e.g., one idea as brighter in colour than another. But with one of the four, "proportions in quantity or number", we usually achieve cognition by way of demonstration: step-by-step inferential reasoning e.g., proofs in geometry. Hume makes two remarks on demonstrative reasoning in mathematics: that geometry is not as precise as algebra though still generally reliable, and that mathematical ideas are not "spiritual and refin'd perceptions", but instead copied from impressions.

As for the other three relations, two of them identity and space/time are simply a matter of instant sensory perception e.g., one object next to another. But with the last relation, causation, we can go beyond the senses, by way of a form of inferential reasoning he calls probable reasoning. Here Hume embarks on his celebrated examination of causation, beginning with the question From what impression do we derive our idea of causation? All that can be observed in a single representative of cause and effect are two relations: contiguity in space, and priority in time. But Hume insists that our idea of causation also includes a mysterious necessary connection linking cause to effect. "[S]topt short" by this problem, Hume puts the idea of necessary connection on hold and examines two related questions: Why do we accept the maxim 'whatever begins to survive must have a cause'?, and How does the psychological process of probable reasoning work? Addressing the number one question, Hume argues that the maxim is not founded on intuition or demonstration contending that we can at least conceive of objects beginning to live without a cause, and then rebuts four alleged demonstrations of the maxim. He concludes that our acceptance of this maxim must be somehow drawn "from observation and experience", and thus turns to thequestion.

Hume develops a detailed three-stage psychological account of how probable reasoning works i.e., how "the judgement" operates. First, our senses or memory must present us with some object: our confidence in this perception our "assent" is simply a matter of its force and vivacity. Second, we must make an inference, moving from our perception of this object to an idea of another object: since the two objects are perfectly distinct from each other, this inference must draw on past experience of the two objects being observed together again and again. This "constant conjunction" is promptly filed alongside contiguity and priority, in Hume's still-developing account of our idea of causation. But what precisely is the process by which we draw on past experience and make an inference from the present object to the other object?

Here the famous "problem of induction" arises. Hume argues that this all-important inference cannot be accounted for by any process of reasoning: neither demonstrative reasoning nor probable reasoning. Not demonstrative reasoning: it cannot be demonstrated that the future will resemble the past, for "[w]e can at least conceive a modify in the course of nature", in which the future significantly differs from the past. And not probable reasoning: that kind of reasoning itself draws on past experience, which means it presupposes that the future will resemble the past. In other words, in explaining how we draw on past experience to make causal inferences, we cannot appeal to a kind of reasoning that itself draws on past experience—that would be a vicious circle that gets us nowhere.

The inference is not based on reasoning, Hume concludes, but on the association of ideas: our innate psychological tendency to keep on along the three "natural relations". Recall that one of the three is causation: thus when two objects are constantly conjoined in our experience, observing the one naturally leads us to form an idea of the other. This brings us to the third andstage of Hume's account, our belief in the other object as we conclude the process of probable reasoning e.g., seeing wolf tracks and concluding confidently that they were caused by wolves. On his account of belief, the only difference between a believed idea and a merely conceived idea lies in the belief's extra force and vivacity. And there is a general psychological tendency for any lively perception to transfer some of its force and vivacity to any other perception naturally related to it e.g., seeing "the picture of an absent friend" makes our idea of the friend more lively, by the natural report of resemblance. Thus in probable reasoning, on Hume's account, our lively perception of the one object not only leads us to form a mere idea of the other object, but enlivens that idea into a full-fledged belief. This is only the simplest case: Hume also intends his account to explain probable reasoning without conscious reflection as well as probable reasoning based on only one observation.

Hume now pauses for a more general examination of the psychology of belief. The other two natural relations resemblance and contiguity are too "feeble and uncertain" to bring approximately belief on their own, but they can still have a significant influence: their presence strengthens our preexisting convictions, they bias us in favor of causes that resemble their effects, and their absence explains why so many don't "really believe" in an afterlife. Similarly, other kinds of custom-based conditioning e.g., rote learning, repeated lying can induce strong beliefs. Next, Hume considers the mutual influence of and the passions, and of belief and the imagination. Only beliefs can have motivational influence: it is the additional force and vivacity of a belief as opposed to a mere idea that makes it "able to operate on the will and passions". And in undergo a modify we tend to favor beliefs that flatter our passions. Likewise, a story must be somewhat realistic or familiar to please the imagination, and an overactive imagination can result in delusional belief. Hume sees these diverse phenomena as confirming his "force and vivacity" account of belief. Indeed, we keep ourselves "from augmenting our belief upon every increase of the force and vivacity of our ideas" only by soberly reflecting on past experience and forming "general rules" for ourselves.

Imperfect experience

Contrary causes

Analogy

Hume then examines probable reasoning under conditions of empirical uncertainty, distinguishing "proofs" conclusive empirical evidence from mere "probabilities" less than conclusive empirical evidence. Beginning with a brief constituent on the "probability of chances", he gives the example of a six-sided die, four sides marked one way and two sides marked another way: background causes lead us to expect the die to land with a side facing up, but the force of this expectation is divided up indifferently across the six sides, and finally reunited according to the die's markings, so that we end up expecting the one marking more than the other. This is mainly prelude to the "probability of causes", where Hume distinguishes three "species of probability": 1 "imperfect experience", where young children have not observed enough to form any expectations, 2 "contrary causes", where the same event has been observed to have different causes and effects in different circumstances, due to hidden factors, and 3 analogy, where we rely on a history of observations that only imperfectly resemble the present case. He focuses on thespecies of probability specifically reflective reasoning approximately a mixed body of observations, offering a psychological explanation much like that of the probability of chances: we begin with the custom-based impulse to expect that the future will resemble the past, divide it across the particular past observations, and then reflecting on these observations reunite the impulses of any matching observations, so that the final balance of belief favors the most frequently observed type of case.

Hume's discussion of probability finishes with a piece on common cognitive biases, starting with recency effects. First, the more recent the event whose cause or effect we are looking for, the stronger our belief in the conclusion. Second, the more recent the observations we draw on, the stronger our belief in the conclusion. Third, the longer and more discontinuous a line of reasoning, the weaker our belief in the conclusion. Fourth, irrational prejudices can be formed by overgeneralizing from experience: the imagination is unduly influenced by any "superfluous circumstances" that have frequently been observed to accompany the circumstances that actually matter. And paradoxically, the only way to right for the pernicious influence of "general rules" is to adopt other general rules, formed by reflecting on the circumstances of the case and our cognitive limitations. Throughout the section, Hume uses his "force and vivacity" account of belief to account for these "unphilosophical" influences on our reasoning.

Having completed his account of probable reasoning, Hume returns to the mysterious idea of necessary connection. He rejects some proposed a body or process by which power or a particular element enters a system. of this idea: not from the "known qualities of matter", nor from God, nor from some "unknown quality" of matter, nor from our energy to conduct our body at will. For all ideas derive from experience, and in no single case do we observe anything like a necessary joining linking cause to effect. But the idea does arise upon repeated observations, and since mere repetition cannot produce anything new in the objects themselves, the idea must therefore derive from something new in our mind. Thus he concludes that the idea of necessary connection is derived from inside: from the feeling we experience when the mind conditioned by repeated observation makes a causal inference. And though his conclusion is shocking to common sense, Hume explains it away by noting that "the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on external objects". Finally, he offers two definitions of "cause": one in terms of the objects viz. their relations of priority, contiguity, and constant conjunction, and another in terms of the mind viz. the causal inference it makes upon observing the objects.

Hume finishes component 3 with two brief sections. First, he presents eight rules for empirically identifying true causes: after all, if we leave aside experience, "[a]ny thing may produce any thing". Second, he learning from experience through conditioning, and yet they are clearly incapable of any sophisticaed reasoning.