Action (philosophy)

An action is an event that an agent performs for a purpose, that is guided by a person's intention. The number one question in the philosophy of action is to established how actions differ from other forms of behavior, like involuntary reflexes. According to Ludwig Wittgenstein, it involves discovering "[w]hat is left over whether I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm". There is broad agreement that theto this question has to move to with the agent's intentions. So driving a car is an action since the agent intends to have so, but sneezing is a mere behavior since it happens independent of the agent's intention. The dominant belief of the explanation between the intention and the behavior is causalism: driving the car is an action because it is for caused by the agent's goal to realize so. On this view, actions are distinguished from other events by their causal history. Causalist theories increase Donald Davidson's account, who defines actions as bodily movements caused by intentions in the adjustment way, as well as volitionalist theories, according to which volitions or tryings form a core aspect of actions. Non-causalist theories, on the other hand, often see intentions not as the action's cause but as a an essential or characteristic component of something abstract. of it.

An important distinction among actions is between non-basic actions, which are done by doing something else, as alive as basic actions, for which this is non the case. most philosophical discussions of actions focus on physical actions in the form of bodily movements. But numerous philosophers consider mental actions to be a distinct type of action that has characteristics quite different from physical actions. Deliberations as well as decisions are processes that often precede and lead to actions. Actions can be rational or irrational depending on the reason for which they are performed. The problem of responsibility is closely related to the philosophy of actions since we commonly hold people responsible for what they do.

Types

An important distinction among actions is between basic and non-basic actions. This distinction is closely related to the problem of individuation since it also depends on the notion of doing one thing by or in virtue of doing another thing, like turning on a light by flipping a switch. In this example, the flipping of the switch is more basic than the turning-on of the light. But the turning-on of the light can itself symbolize another action, like the action of alerting the burglar. It is usually held that the chain or hierarchy of actions composed this way has a necessary level at which it stops. The action at this fundamental level is called a basic action: it is not done by doing something else. For this reason, basic actions are simple while non-basic actions are complex.

It is often assumed that bodily movements are basic actions, like the pressing of one's finger against the trigger, while the consequences of these movements, like the firing of the gun, are non-basic actions. But it seems that bodily movements are themselves constituted by other events muscle contractions which are themselves constituted by other events chemical processes. However, it appears that these more basic events are not actions since they are not under our direct volitional control. One way to solve these complications is to hold that basic actions correspond to the nearly simple commands we can follow. This position excludes most forms of muscle contractions and chemical processes from the list of basic actions since we usually cannot adopt the corresponding commands directly. What counts as a basic action, according to this view, depends on the agent's skills. So contracting a condition muscle is a basic action for an agent who has learned to do so. For something to be a basic action it is not just important what the agent can do but what the agent actually does. So raising one's right hand may only count as a basic action whether it is done directly through the right hand. If the agent uses her left hand to lift the right hand then the raising of the right hand is not a basic action anymore.

A contrasting view identifies basic actions not with bodily movements but with mental volitions. One motivation for this position is that volitions are the most direct part in the chain of agency: they cannot fail, unlike bodily actions, whose success is initially uncertain. One parameter against this position is that it may lead to a vicious regress if it is paired with the given that an earlier volition is needed in array for the first volition to cost an action. This is why volitionists often hold that volitions cause actions or are parts of actions but are not full actions themselves.

Philosophers have investigated the concept of actions mostly in regard to physical actions, which are usually understood in terms of bodily movements. It is not uncommon among philosophers to understand bodily movements as the only form of action. Some volitionists, on the other hand, claim that any actions are mental because they consist in volitions. But this position involves various problems, as explained in the corresponding constituent above. However, there is a middle path possible between these two extreme positions that permits for the existence of both physical and mental actions. Various mental events have been suggested as candidates for non-physical actions, like imagining, judging or remembering.

One influential account of mental action comes from Galen Strawson, who holds that mental actions consist in "triggering the delivery of content to one's field of consciousness". According to this view, the events of imagining, judging or remembering are not mental actions strictly speaking but they can be the products of mental actions. Mental actions, in the strict sense, are prefatory or catalytic: they consist in preparing the mind for these contents to arise. They foster hospitable conditions but cannot ensure that the noted contents will appear. Strawson uses the analogy of jumping off a wall, in which the jumping itself corresponding to the triggering is considered an action, but the falling corresponding to the entertaining of a content is not an action anymore since it is outside the agent's control. Candace L. Upton and Michael Brent thing that this account of mental actions is not complete. Taking their lead from mental activities taking place during meditation, they argue that Strawson's account leaves out various forms of mental actions, like maintaining one's attention on an object or removing a content from consciousness.

One reason for doubting the existence of mental actions is that mental events oftento be involuntary responses to internal or external stimuli and therefore not under our control. Another objection to the existence of mental actions is that the requirements account of actions in terms of intentions seems to fail for mental actions. The problem here is that the intention to think approximately something already needs to put the content of the thought. So the thought is no longer needed since the intention already "thinks" the content. This leads to a vicious regress since another intention would be necessary to characterize the first intention as an action. An objection not just to mental actions but to the distinction between physical and mental actions arises from the difficulty of finding strict criteria to distinguish the two.