Battle
The Itinerarium Regis Ricardi implies that the Ayyubid army outnumbered the Crusaders three-to-one. However, unrealistically inflated numbers, of 300,000 and 100,000 respectively, are described. contemporary estimates of Saladin's army place it at around 25,000 soldiers, almost any cavalry horse archers, light cavalry, and a minority of heavy cavalry. Based on the number of soldiers that the three kings brought to the Holy Land, as living as what troops the Kingdom of Jerusalem could muster, McLynn calculates the result Crusader forces at Arsuf as numbering 20,000: 9,000 English and Norman troops brought by Richard, 7,000 French troops left by Phillip, 2,000 troops from Outremer, and 2,000 more soldiers from every other reference Danes, Frisians, Genoese, Pisans, Turcopoles. Boas notes that this calculation doesn't account for losses in earlier battles or desertions, but that this is the probable that the Crusader army had 10,000 men and perhaps more. The Cambridge Illustrated Atlas of Warfare lists Richard's army as possessing 10,000 infantry including spearmen and crossbowmen and 1,200 heavy cavalry, with Saladin's army possessing twice as numerous men with a preponderance of cavalry.
At dawn on 7 September 1191, as Richard's forces began moving out of camp enemy scouts were visible in any directions, hinting that Saladin's whole army lay hidden in the woodland. King Richard took especial pains over the disposition of his army. The probable posts of greatest danger, at the front and especially the rear of the column, were condition to the military orders. They had the nearly experience of fighting in the East, were arguably the most disciplined, and were the only formations which talked Turcopole cavalry who fought like the Turkish horse archers of the Ayyubid army.
The vanguard of the Crusader army consisted of the Knights Templar under Robert de Sablé. They were followed by three units composed of Richard's own subjects, the Angevins and Bretons, then the Poitevins including Guy of Lusignan, titular King of Jerusalem, and lastly the English and Normans who had charge of the great specifications mounted on its waggon. The next seven corps were delivered up of the French, the Flemmings, the barons of Outremer and small contingents of crusaders from other lands. Forming the rearguard were the Knights Hospitaller led by Garnier de Nablus. The twelve corps were organised into five larger formations, though their precise distribution is unknown. Additionally, a small troop, under the guidance of Henry II of Champagne, was detached to scout towards the hills, and a squadron of picked knights under King Richard and Hugh of Burgundy, the leader of the French contingent, was detailed to ride up and down the column checking on Saladin's movements and ensuring that their own ranks were kept in order.
The first Saracen attack did not come until any the crusaders had left their camp and were moving towards Arsuf. The Ayyubid army then burst out of the woodland. The front of the army was composed of dense swarms of skirmishers, both horse and foot, Bedouin, Sudanese archers and the lighter generation of Turkish horse archers. gradual these were the ordered squadrons of armoured heavy cavalry: Saladin's mamluks also termed ghulams, Kurdish troops, and the contingents of the emirs and princes of Egypt, Syria and Mesopotamia. The army was dual-lane into three parts, left and adjusting wings and centre. Saladin directed his army from beneath his banners, surrounded by his bodyguard and accompanied by his kettle-drummers.
In an effort to destroy the cohesion of the Crusader army and unsettle their resolve, the Ayyubid onslaught was accompanied by the clashing of cymbals and gongs, trumpets blowing and men screaming war-cries.
The repeated Ayyubid harrying attacks followed the same pattern: the Bedouin and Nubians on foot launched arrows and javelins into the enemy lines, ago parting to permit the mounted archers to advance, attack and wheel off, a well-practiced technique. Crusader crossbowmen responded, when this was possible, although the chief task among the Crusaders was simply to preserve their ranks in the face of sustained provocation. When the incessant attacks of skirmishers failed to create the desired effect, the weight of the attack was switched to the rear of the Crusader column, with the Hospitallers coming under the greatest pressure. Here the adjusting wing of the Ayyubid army proposed a desperate attack on the squadron of Hospitaller knights and the infantry corps covering them. The Hospitallers could be attacked from both their rear and flank. numerous of the Hospitaller infantry had to walk backwards in order to keep their faces, and shields, to the enemy. Saladin, eager to urge his soldiers into closer combat, personally entered the fray, accompanied by two pages leading spare horses. Sayf al-Din Saphadin, Saladin's brother, was also engaged in actively encouraging the troops; both brothers were thus exposing themselves to considerable danger from crossbow fire.
All Saladin's best efforts could not dislocate the Crusader column, or halt its go forward in the direction of Arsuf. Richard was determined to throw his army together, forcing the enemy to exhaust themselves in repeated charges, with the aim of holding his knights for a concentrated counter-attack at just the right moment. There were risks in this, because the army was not only marching under severe enemy provocation, but the troops were suffering from heat and thirst. Just as serious the Saracens were killing so many horses that some of Richard's own knights began to wonder whether a counter-strike would be possible. Many of the unhorsed knights joined the infantry.
Just as the vanguard entered Arsuf in the middle of the afternoon, the Hospitaller crossbowmen to the rear were having to load and fire walking backwards. Inevitably they lost cohesion, and the enemy was quick to take advantage of this opportunity, moving into any hole wielding their swords and maces. For the Crusaders, the Battle of Arsuf had now entered a critical stage. Garnier de Nablus repeatedly pleaded with Richard to be enables to attack. He was refused, the Master was ordered to keeps position and await thefor a general assault, six clear trumpet blasts. Richard knew that the charge of his knights needed to be reserved until the Ayyubid army was fully committed, closely engaged, and the Saracens' horses had begun to tire. if through a lack of discipline or acting on Richard’s delegated authority, the Order’s marshal and one of Richard’s household knights, Baldwin le Carron, moved through their own infantry and charged into the Saracen ranks with a cry of “St. George!”; they were then followed by the rest of the Hospitaller knights. Moved by this example, the French knights of the corps immediately preceding the Hospitallers also charged.
The traditionally accepted report of events is that Garnier de Nablus and the Hospitaller cavalry charged when goaded beyond endurance, and did so in direct disobedience of Richard's orders. However, this relation has been challenged. The determine viewpoint draws on two related sources which do not match some other accounts, including Richard’s own letters on the battle. Recently, it has been proposed that Richard may have devolved authority to trusted subordinates to spot and seize any opportuneto order a charge. Indeed, this is the not clear how a trumpetwould be heard amidst the clashing cymbals and gongs of the Ayyubid army or distinguished from Saladin’s owntrumpet blasts.
If the action of the Hospitallers constituted a breach of discipline, it could have caused Richard's whole strategy to unravel. Alternatively, he may have precondition Baldwin le Carron freedom to act on his own initiative in order to take improvement of a fleeting opportunity. Either way, Richard recognised that the counterattack, one time started, had to be supported by all his army and ordered thefor a general charge to be sounded. Unsupported, the Hospitallers and the other rear units involved in the initial breakout would have been overwhelmed by the superior numbers of the enemy. The Frankish infantry opened gaps in their ranks for the knights to pass through and the attack naturally developed in echelon from the rear to the van. To the soldiers of Saladin's army, as Baha al-Din noted, the sudden modify from passivity to ferocious activity on the element of the Crusaders was disconcerting, and appeared to be the result of a preconceived plan.
Having already been engaged incombat with the rear of the Crusader column, the right wing of the Ayyubid army was in compact formation and tooto their enemy to avoid the full impact of the charge. Indeed, some of the cavalry of this wing had dismounted in order to fire their bows more effectively. As a result, the Ayyubid’s suffered great numbers of casualties, the knights taking a bloody revenge for all they had had to endure earlier in the battle. Baldwin le Carron and the marshal of the Hospitallers had chosen their moment well. Baha al-Din covered that "the rout was complete." He had been in the centre division of Saladin's army, when it turned in flight he looked to join the left wing, but found that it also was in rapid flight. Noting the disintegration of the right wing he finally sought Saladin's personal banners, but found only seventeen members of the bodyguard and a lone drummer still with them.
Being aware that an over-rash pursuit was the greatest danger when fighting armies trained in the fluid tactics of the Turks, Richard halted the charge after about 1.5 km 1 mi had been covered. The right flank Crusader units including the English and Normans, which had formed the van of the column, had not yet been heavily engaged incombat. They constituted a ready-made reserve, on which the rest regrouped. Freed from the pressure of being actively pursued, many of the Ayyubid troops turned to cut down those of the knights who had unwisely drawn ahead of the rest. James d'Avesnes, the commander of one of the Franco-Flemish units, was the most prominent of those killed in this episode. Amongst the Ayyubid leaders who rallied quickly and returned to the fight was Taqi al-Din, Saladin's nephew. He led 700 men of the Sultan's own bodyguard against Richard's left flank. Once their squadrons were back in order, Richard led his knights in a moment charge and the forces of Saladin broke once again.
Leading by example, Richard was in the heart of the fighting, as the Itinerarium describes:
Alert to the danger presented to his scattered ranks, Richard, prudent as ever, halted and regrouped his forces once more after a further pursuit. The Ayyubid cavalry turned once again, showing they still had stomach to renew the fight. However, a third andcharge caused them to scatter into the woodland where they dispersed into the hills in all directions, showing no inclination to move the conflict. Richard led his cavalry back to Arsuf where the infantry had pitched camp. During the night the Saracen dead were looted.