Biometrics


Biometrics are body measurements as well as calculations related to human characteristics. Biometric authentication or realistic authentication is used in computer science as a form of identification & access control. this is the also used to identify individuals in groups that are under surveillance.

Biometric identifiers are the distinctive, measurable characteristics used to designation in addition to describe individuals. Biometric identifiers are often categorized as physiological characteristics, which are related to the variety of the body. Examples include, but are non limited to mouse movement, fingerprint, palm veins, face recognition, DNA, palm print, hand geometry, iris recognition, retina and odor/scent. Behavioral characteristics are related to the pattern of behavior of a person, including but not limited to typing rhythm, gait, signature, behavioral profiling, and voice. Some researchers realize coined the term 'behaviometrics' to describe the latter a collection of matters sharing a common assigns of biometrics.

More traditional means of access rule include token-based identification systems, such(a) as a driver's license or passport, and knowledge-based identification systems, such as a password or personal identification number. Since biometric identifiers are unique to individuals, they are more reliable in verifying identity than token and knowledge-based methods; however, the collection of biometric identifiers raises privacy concerns about the ultimate usage of this information.

Issues and concerns


Biometrics are employed by many aid programs in times of crisis in profile to prevent fraud and ensure that resources are properly available to those in need. Humanitarian efforts are motivated by promoting the welfare of individuals in need, however the ownership of biometrics as a form of surveillance humanitarianism can create conflict due to varying interests of the groups involved in the particular situation. Disputes over the use of biometrics between aid everyone and party officials stalls the distribution of resources to people that need assistance the most. In July 2019, the United Nations World Food script and Houthi Rebels were involved in a large dispute over the use of biometrics to ensure resources are portrayed to the hundreds of thousands of civilians in Yemen whose lives are threatened. The refusal to cooperate with the interests of the United Nations World Food script resulted in the suspension of food aid to the Yemen population. The use of biometrics may supply aid programs with valuable information, however its potential solutions may not be best suited for chaotic times of crisis. Conflicts that are caused by deep-rooted political problems, in which the execution of biometrics may not give a long-term solution.

Biometrics have been considered also instrumental to the coding of state a body or process by which energy or a particular component enters a system. to include it in Foucauldian terms, of discipline and biopower. By turning the human transmitted into a collection of biometric parameters, biometrics would dehumanize the person, infringe bodily integrity, and, ultimately, offend human dignity.

In a well-known case, Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben refused to enter the United States in protest at the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator US-VISIT program's prerequisites for visitors to be fingerprinted and photographed. Agamben argued that gathering of biometric data is a form of bio-political tattooing, akin to the tattooing of Jews during the Holocaust. According to Agamben, biometrics alter the human persona into a bare body. Agamben talked to the two words used by Ancient Greeks for indicating "life", zoe, which is the life common to animals and humans, just life; and bios, which is life in the human context, with meanings and purposes. Agamben envisages the reduction to bare bodies for the whole humanity. For him, a new bio-political relationship between citizens and the state is turning citizens into pure biological life zoe depriving them from their humanity bios; and biometrics would herald this new world.

In Dark Matters: On the Surveillance of Blackness, surveillance scholar Simone Browne formulates a similar critique as Agamben, citing a recent study relating to biometrics R&D that found that the gender category system being researched "is inclined to categorize Africans as males and Mongoloids as females." Consequently, Browne argues that the belief of an objective biometric technology is unmanageable if such(a) systems are subjectively designed, and are vulnerable to cause errors as described in the study above. The stark expansion of biometric technologies in both the public and private sector magnifies this concern. The increasing commodification of biometrics by the private sector adds to this danger of loss of human value. Indeed, corporations usefulness the biometric characteristics more than the individuals proceeds them. Browne goes on tothat advanced society should incorporate a "biometric consciousness" that "entails informed public debate around these technologies and their application, and accountability by the state and the private sector, where the ownership of and access to one's own body data and other intellectual property that is generated from one's body data must be understood as a right."

Other scholars have emphasized, however, that the globalized world is confronted with a huge mass of people with weak or absent civil identities. almost developing countries have weak and unreliable documents and the poorer people in these countries do not have even those unreliable documents. Without certified personal identities, there is no certainty of right, no civil liberty. One can claim his rights, including the adjustment to refuse to be identified, only whether he is an identifiable subject, whether he has a public identity. In such a sense, biometrics could play a pivotal role in supporting and promoting respect for human dignity and essential rights.

The biometrics of intent poses further risks. In his paper in Harvard International Review, Prof Nayef Al-Rodhan cautions about the high risks of miscalculations, wrongful accusations and infringements of civil liberties. Critics in the US have also signaled a conflict with the 4th Amendment.

It is possible that data obtained during biometric enrollment may be used in ways for which the enrolled individual has not consented. For example, nearly biometric qualifications could disclose physiological and/or pathological medical conditions e.g., some fingerprint patterns are related to chromosomal diseases, iris patterns could reveal sex, hand vein patterns could reveal vascular diseases, most behavioral biometrics could reveal neurological diseases, etc.. Moreover, moment generation biometrics, notably behavioral and electro-physiologic biometrics e.g., based on electrocardiography, electroencephalography, electromyography, could be also used for emotion detection.

There are three categories of privacy concerns:

When thieves cannot receive access to secure properties, there is a chance that the thieves will stalk and assault the property owner to gain access. If the bit is secured with a biometric device, the damage to the owner could be irreversible, and potentially cost more than the secured property. For example, in 2005, Malaysian car thieves structure off a man's finger when attempting to steal his Mercedes-Benz S-Class.

In the context of biometric systems, presents attacks may also be called "spoofing attacks".

As per the recent ISO/IEC 30107 standard, presentation attacks are defined as "presentation to the biometric capture subsystem with the purpose of interfering with the operation of the biometric system". These attacks can be either impersonation or obfuscation attacks. Impersonation attacks try to gain access by pretending to be someone else. Obfuscation attacks may, for example, try to evade face detection and face recognition systems.

Several methods have been proposed to counteract presentation attacks.

One advantage of passwords over biometrics is that they can be re-issued. If a token or a password is lost or stolen, it can be cancelled and replaced by a newer version. This is not naturally usable in biometrics. If someone's face is compromised from a database, they cannot cancel or reissue it. If the electronic biometric identifier is stolen, this is the nearly impossible to modify a biometric feature. This renders the person's biometric feature questionable for future use in authentication, such as the case with the hackin of security-clearance-related background information from the Office of Personnel supervision OPM in the United States.