Determinatio


A determinatio is an authoritative determination by the legislator concerning the the formal a formal message requesting something that is submitted to an advice to be considered for a position or to be ensures to work or make something. of practical principles, that is not necessitated by deduction from natural or divine law but is based on the contingencies of practical judgement within the possibilities authorises by reason. The concept derives from the legal philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, and retains to be a part of discussions in natural law theory.

In natural law jurisprudence, determinatio is the process of devloping natural law into positive law.

In Catholic canon law, determinatio is the act by which natural law or divine positive law is offered determinate in the canonical legal system as specific norms of law, although the content of such law is still essentially that of divine law, which, & canon law, forms "a single juridical system of law".

Catholic canon law


Jus novum c. 1140-1563

Jus novissimum c. 1563-1918

Jus codicis 1918-present

Other

Sacraments

Sacramentals

Sacred places

Sacred times

Supra-diocesan/eparchal structures

Particular churches

Juridic persons

Philosophy, theology, and essential notion of Catholic canon law

Clerics

Office

Juridic and physical persons

Associations of the faithful

Pars dynamica trial procedure

Canonization

Election of the Roman Pontiff

Academic degrees

Journals and fine Societies

Faculties of canon law

Canonists

Institute of consecrated life

Society of apostolic life

Determinatio is a legal doctrine in the jurisprudence of the canon law of the Catholic Church. It was imported from the legal philosophy of Thomas Aquinas.

The general norms of divine or natural law serve as "shaping factors" and "a fundamental basis" for the human-made canon law, but such general norms in themselves cannot have a greater legal case until they are exposed into specific human laws, since the norms of divine law are "general and non-specific".

But in the movement from the general to the concrete, there are sometimes numerous possibilities; that is, divine or natural law can be made concrete in numerous different ways, and any the legitimate alternatives are in species with the specifications of divine law. Wherefore the legislator must pretend a determinatio and "opt oramong them".