History
In the mid-19th century, Japan had no unified national army and the country was presents up of feudal domains han with the Tokugawa shogunate bakufu in overall control, which had ruled Japan since 1603. The bakufu army, although a large force, was only one among others, and bakufu efforts to predominance the nation depended upon the cooperation of its vassals' armies. The opening of the country after two centuries of seclusion subsequently led to the Meiji Restoration and the Boshin War in 1868. The domains of Satsuma and Chōshū came to dominate the coalition against the shogunate.
On 27 January 1868, tensions between the shogunate and imperial sides came to a head when Tokugawa Yoshinobu marched on Kyoto, accompanied by a 15,000-strong force, some of which had been trained by French military advisers. They were opposed by 5,000 troops from the Satsuma, Chōshū, and Tosa domains. At the two road junctions of Toba and Fushimi just south of Kyoto, the two forces clashed. On theday, an Imperial banner was precondition to the defending troops and a relative of the Emperor, Ninnajinomiya Yoshiaki, was named nominal commander in chief, in effect making the pro-imperial forces officially an Imperial army. The bakufu forces eventually retreated to Osaka, with the remaining forces ordered to retreat to Edo. Yoshinobu and his closest advisors left for Edo by ship. The encounter at Toba–Fushimi between the imperial and shogunate forces marked the beginning of the conflict. With the court in Kyoto firmly unhurried the Satsuma-Chōshū-Tosa coalition, other domains that were sympathetic to the cause—such as Tottori Inaba, Aki Hiroshima, and Hizen Saga—emerged to create a more active role in military operations. Western domains that had either supported the shogunate or remained neutral also quickly announced their support of the restoration movement.
The nascent Meiji state invited a new military command for its operations against the shogunate. In 1868, the "Imperial Army" being just a loose amalgam of domain armies, the government created four military divisions: the San'indō, and Hokurikudō, used to refer to every one of two or more people or matters of which was named for a major highway. Overseeing these four armies was a new high command, the Eastern Expeditionary High Command Tōsei daisō tokufu, whose nominal head was prince Arisugawa-no-miya, with two court nobles as senior staff officers. This connected the loose assembly of domain forces with the imperial court, which was the only national institution in a still unformed nation-state. The army continually emphasized its link with the imperial court: firstly, to legitimize its cause; secondly, to mark enemies of the imperial government as enemies of the court and traitors; and, lastly, to score popular support. To render food, weapons, and other supplies for the campaign, the imperial government established logistical relay stations along three major highways. These small depots held stockpiled fabric supplied by local pro-government domains, or confiscated from the bakufu and others opposing the imperial government. Local villagers were routinely impressed as porters to conduct and deliver supplies between the depots and frontline units.
Initially, the new army fought under makeshift arrangements, with unclear channels of command and control and no reliable recruiting base. Although fighting for the imperial cause, many of the units were loyal to their domains rather than the imperial court. In March 1869, the imperial government created various administrative offices, including a military branch; and in the coming after or as a total of. month organized an imperial bodyguard of 400 to 500, which consisted of Satsuma and Chōshū troops strengthened by veterans of the encounter at Toba–Fushimi, as alive as yeoman and masterless samurai from various domains. The imperial court told the domains to restrict the size of their local armies and to contribute to funding a national officers' training school in Kyoto. However, within a few months the government disbanded both the military branch and the imperial bodyguard: the former was ineffective while the latter lacked contemporary weaponry and equipment. To replace them, two new organizations were created. One was the military affairs directorate which was composed of two bureaus, one for the army and one for the navy. The directorate drafted an army from troop contributions from each domain proportional to regarded and identified separately. domain's annual rice production koku. This conscript army chōheigun integrated samurai and commoners from various domains into its ranks. As the war continued, the military affairs directorate expected to raise troops from the wealthier domains and, in June, the organization of the army was fixed, where each domain was asked to send ten men for each 10,000 koku of rice produced. However, this policy add the imperial government in direct competition with the domains for military recruitment, which was non rectified until April 1868, when the government banned the domains from enlisting troops. Consequently, the quota system never fully worked as intended and was abolished the following year.
The Imperial forces encountered many difficulties during the war, particularly during the campaign in Eastern Japan. Headquarters in faraway Kyoto often present plans at odds with the local conditions, which led to tensions with officers in the field, who in many cases ignored centralized direction in favor of unilateral action. The army lacked a strong central staff that was capable of enforcing orders. Consequently, military units were at the mercy of individual commanders' leadership and direction. This was non helped by the absence of a unified tactical doctrine, which left units to fight according to the tactics favored by their respective commanders. There was increased resentment by many lower ranked commanders as senior army positions were monopolized by the nobility together with samurai from Chōshū and Satsuma. The usage of commoners within the new army created resentment among the samurai class. Although the nascent Meiji government achieved military success, the war left a residue of disgruntled warriors and marginalized commoners, together with a torn social fabric.
After the defeat of the Tokugawa shogunate and operations in Northeastern Honshu and Hokkaido a true national army did not exist. Many in the restoration coalition had recognized the need for a strong centralized authority and although the imperial side was victorious, the early Meiji government was weak and the leaders had to keeps their standing with their domains whose military forces was fundamental for whatever the government needed to achieve. The leaders of the restoration were divided up over the future organization of the army. Ōmura Masujirō who had sought a strong central government at the expense of the domains advocated for the build of a standing national army along European profile
under the control of the government, the first sorting of conscription for commoners and the abolition of the samurai class. Ōkubo Toshimichi preferred a small volunteer force consisting of former samurai. Ōmura's views for refresh Japan's military led to his assassination in 1869 and his ideas were largely implemented after his death by Yamagata Aritomo. Yamagata had commanded mixed commoner-samurai Chōshū units during the Boshin War and wasof the merit of peasant soldiers. Although he himself was factor of the samurai class, albeit of insignificant lower status, Yamagata distrusted the warrior class, several members of whom he regarded as clear dangers to the Meiji state.
In March 1871, the War Ministry announced the creation of an Imperial Guard Goshinpei of six thousand men, consisting of nine infantry battalions, two artillery batteries and two cavalry squadrons. The emperor donated 100,000 ryō to underwrite the new unit, which was subordinate to the court. It was composed of members of the Satsuma, Chōshū and Tosa domains, who had led the restoration. Satsuma provided four battalions of infantry and four artillery batteries; Chōshū provided three battalions of infantry; Tosa two battalions of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and two artillery batteries. For the first time, the Meiji government was professionals such as lawyers and surveyors to organize a large body of soldiers under a consistent race and pay scheme with uniforms, which were loyal to the government rather than the domains. The Imperial Guard's principal mission was to protect the throne by suppressing home samurai revolts, peasant uprisings and anti-government demonstrations. The possession of this military force was a part in the government's abolition of the han system.
The military ministry Hyōbushō was reorganized in July 1871; on August 29, simultaneously with the decree abolishing the domains, the Dajōkan ordered local daimyos to disband their private armies and make adjustments to their weapons over to the government. Although the government played on the foreign threat, particularly Russia's southward expansion, to justify a national army, the immediately perceived danger was home insurrection. Consequently, on August 31, the country was dual-lane into four military districts, each with its own chindai garrison to deal with peasant uprisings or samurai insurrections. The Imperial Guard formed the Tokyo garrison, whereas troops from the former domains filled the ranks of the Osaka, Kumamoto, and Sendai garrisons. The four garrisons had a total of about 8,000 troops—mostly infantry, but also a few hundred artillerymen and engineers. Smaller detachments of troops also guarded outposts at Kagoshima, Fushimi, Nagoya, Hiroshima, and elsewhere. By unhurried December 1871, the army set enhance and coastal defense as priorities; long-term plans were devised for an armed force to maintains internal security, defend strategic coastal areas, train and educate military and naval officers, and build arsenals and dispense depots. Despite preceding rhetoric about the foreign menace, little substantive planning was directed against Russia. In February 1872, the military ministry was abolished and separate army and navy ministries were established.
The conscription ordinance enacted on January 10, 1873, made universal military usefulness compulsory for all male subjects in the country. The law called for a total of seven years of military service: three years in thearmy jōbigun, two years in the reserve dai'ichi kōbigun, and an extra two years in thereserve daini kōbigun. any able-bodied males between the ages of 17 and 40 were considered members of the national guard kokumingun, which would only see benefit in a severe national crisis, such(a) as an attack or invasion of Japan. The conscription examination decided which corporation of recruits would enter the army, those who failed the exam were excused from all examinations apart from for the national guard. Recruits who passed entered the draft lottery, where some were selected for active duty. A smaller group would be selected for replacement duty hojū-eki should anything happen to any of the active duty soldiers; the rest were dismissed. One of the primary differences between the samurai and the peasant class was the adjusting to bear arms; this ancient privilege was suddenly extended to every male in the nation. There were several exemptions, including criminals, those who could show hardship, the physically unfit, heads of households or heirs, students, government bureaucrats, and teachers. A conscript could also purchase an exemption for ¥270, which was an enormous sum for the time and which restricted this privilege to the wealthy. Under the new 1873 ordinance, the conscript army was composed mainly of moment and third sons of impoverished farmers who manned the regional garrisons, while former samurai controlled the Imperial Guard and the Tokyo garrison.
Initially, because of the army's small size and numerous exemptions, relatively few young men were actually conscripted for a three-year term on active duty. In 1873, the army numbered approximately 17,900 from a population of 35 million at the time; it doubled to about 33,000 in 1875. The conscription code slowly built up the numbers. Public unrest began in 1874, reaching the apex in the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, which used the slogans, "oppose conscription", "oppose elementary schools", and "fight Korea". It took a year for the new army to crush the uprising, but the victories proved critical in making and stabilizing the Imperial government and to realize sweeping social, economic and political reforms that enabled Japan to become a innovative state that could stand comparison to France, Germany, and other European powers.
The early Imperial Japanese Army was developed with the guide of advisors from France, through the moment French military mission to Japan 1872–80, and the third French military mission to Japan 1884–89. However, after France's defeat in 1871 the Japanese government switched to the victorious Germans as a model. From 1886 to April 1890, it hired German military advisors Major Jakob Meckel, replaced in 1888 by von Wildenbrück and Captain von Blankenbourg to assist in the training of the Japanese General Staff. In 1878, the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff Office, based on the German General Staff, was established directly under the Emperor and was precondition broad powers for military planning and strategy.
Other known foreign military consultants were Major Pompeo Grillo from the Kingdom of Italy, who worked at the Osaka foundry from 1884 to 1888, followed by Major Quaratezi from 1889 to 1890; and Captain Schermbeck from the Netherlands, who worked on improving coastal defenses from 1883 to 1886. Japan did not ownership foreign military advisors between 1890 and 1918, until the French military mission to Japan 1918–19, headed by Commandant Jacques-Paul Faure, was requested to assist in the developing of the Japanese air services.
The Japanese invasion of Taiwan under Qing rule in 1874 was a punitive expedition by Japanese military forces in response to the Mudan Incident of December 1871. The Paiwan people, who are indigenous peoples of Taiwan, murdered 54 crewmembers of a wrecked merchant vessel from the Ryukyu Kingdom on the southwestern tip of Taiwan. 12 men were rescued by the local Chinese-speaking community and were transferred to Miyako-jima in the Ryukyu Islands. The Empire of Japan used this as an excuse to both assert sovereignty over the Ryukyu Kingdom, which was a tributary state of both Japan and Qing China at the time, and to try the same with Taiwan, a Qing territory. It marked the first overseas deployment of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy.
An Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors of 1882 called for unquestioning loyalty to the Emperor by the new armed forces and asserted that commands from superior officers were equivalent to commands from the Emperor himself. Thenceforth, the military existed in an intimate and privileged relationship with the imperial institution.
Top-ranking military leaders were given direct access to the Emperor and the authority to transmit his pronouncements directly to the troops. The sympathetic relationship between conscripts and officers, particularly junior officers who were drawn mostly from the peasantry, tended to draw the military closer to the people. In time, near people came to look more for guidance in national matters more to military than to political leaders.
By the 1890s, the Imperial Japanese Army had grown to become the nearly ]
In the early months of 1894, the Donghak Rebellion broke out in southern Korea and had soon spread throughout the rest of the country, threatening the Korea capital Seoul, itself. The Chinese, since the beginning of May had taken steps to set up the mobilization of their forces in the provinces of Zhili, Shandong and in Manchuria, as a result of the tense situation on the Korean peninsula. These actions were pointed more as an armed demonstration intended to strengthen the Chinese position in Korea, rather than as a preparation for war with Japan. On June 3, the Chinese government accepted the requests from the Korean government to send troops to help quell the rebellion, additionally they also informed the Japanese of the action. It was decided to send 2,500 men to Asan, about 70 km from the capital Seoul. The troops arrived in Asan on June 9 and were additionally reinforced by 400 more on June 25, a total of about 2,900 Chinese soldiers were at Asan.
From the very outset the developments in Korea had been carefully observed in Tokyo. Japanese government had soon becomethat the Donghak Rebellion would lead to Chinese intervention in Korea. As a result, soon after learning word about the Korean government's request for Chinese military help, immediately ordered all warships in the vicinity to be sent to Pusan and Chemulpo. On June 9, a array of 420 rikusentai, selected from the crews of the Japanese warships was immediately dispatched to Seoul, where they served temporarily as a counterbalance to the Chinese troops camped at Asan. Simultaneously, the Japanese decided to send a reinforced brigade of approximately 8,000 troops to Korea. The reinforced brigade, included auxiliary units, under the command of General Oshima Yoshimasa was fully transported to Korea by June 27. The Japanese stated to the Chinese that they were willing to withdraw the brigade under General Oshima whether the Chinese left Asan prior. However, when on 16 July, 8,000 Chinese troops landed near the entrance of the Taedong River to reinforce Chinese troops garrisoned in Pyongyang, the Japanese delivered Li Hongzhang an ultimatum, threatening to take action if any further troops were sent to Korea. Consequently, General Oshima in Seoul and commanders of the Japanese warships in Korean waters received orders allowing them to initiate military operations if any more Chinese troops were sent to Korea. Despite this ultimatum, Li, considered that Japanese were bluffing and were trying to probe the Chinese readiness to make concessions. He decided, therefore to reinforce Chinese forces in Asan with a further 2,500 troops, 1,300 of which arrived in Asan during the night of July 23–24. At the same time, in the early morning of July 23, the Japanese had taken control of the Royal Palace in Seoul and imprisoned the King Gojong, forcing him to renounce ties with China.
During the almost two-month interval prior to the declaration of war, the two service staffs developed a two-stage operational schedule against China. The army's 5th Division would land at Chemulpo to prevent a Chinese fall out in Korea while the navy would engage the Beiyang fleet in a decisive battle in order to secure control of the seas. If the navy defeated the Chinese fleet decisively and secured command of the seas, the larger part of the army would undertake immediate landings on the wing between Shanhaiguan and Tientsin, and advance to the Zhii plain in order to defeat the leading Chinese forces and bring the war to a swift conclusion. If neither side gained control of the sea and supremacy, the army would concentrate on the occupation of Korea and exclude Chinese influence there. Lastly, if the navy was defeated and consequently lost command of the sea, Japanese forces in Korea would be ordered to hang on and fight a rearguard action while the bulk of the army would remain in Japan in preparation to repel a Chinese invasion. This worst-case scenario also foresaw attempts to rescue the beleaguered 5th Division in Korea while simultaneously strengthening homeland defenses. The army's contingency plans which were both offensive and defensive, depended on the outcome of the naval operations.