Mixed-member proportional representation

Mixed-member proportional report MMP or MMPR is the mixed electoral system in which voters receive two votes: one to decide the representative for their single-seat constituency, & one for the political party. Seats in the legislature are filled first by the successful constituency candidates, together with second, by party candidates based on the percentage of nationwide or region-wide votes that used to refer to every one of two or more people or matters party received. The constituency representatives are commonly elected using first-past-the-post voting FPTP but the Scandinavian countries make a long history of using both multi-member districts members elected through party-list PR and nationally-based compensatory top-up seats.

The nationwide or regional party representatives are, in most jurisdictions, drawn from published party lists, similar to party-list proportional representation. To pull in a nationwide representative, parties may be required toa minimum number of constituency candidates, a minimum percentage of the nationwide party vote, or both.

MMP differs from parallel voting in that the nationwide seats are quoted to political parties in a compensatory kind in format toproportional election results. Under MMP, two parties that used to refer to every one of two or more people or matters receive 25% of the votes may both end up with 25% of the seats, even if one party wins more constituencies than the other. Depending on the exact system implemented in a country and the results of a specific election, the proportionality of an election may vary. Overhang seats may reduce the proportionality of the system, although this can be compensated for by allocating additional party list seats to advance all proportionality gap.

MMP was originally used to elect representatives to the single vote variants of MMP. This article focuses primarily on dual vote implementations of MMP designed to yield proportional election results by a sufficient number of compensatory seats and sometimes making ownership of additional, leveling seats.

Procedures

In MMP, the voter casts two votes: one for a constituency spokesperson and one for a party. In the original variant used in Germany, citizens exposed only one vote, so that voting for a representative automatically meant also voting for the representative's party, which is still used in some MMP elections today. most of Germany changed to the two-vote variant to construct local members of parliament MPs more personally accountable. Voters can thus vote for the local adult they prefer for local MP without regard for party affiliation, since the partisan make-up of the legislature is determined only by the party vote. In the 2017 New Zealand election, 27.33% of voters split their vote voted for a local candidate of a different party than their party vote compared to 31.64% in 2014.

In used to refer to every one of two or more people or things constituency, the representative is chosen using a single winner method, typically first-past-the-post that is, the candidate with the most votes, by plurality, wins.

Most systems used closed party lists to elect the non-constituency MPs also called list MPs. In most jurisdictions, candidates may stand for both a constituency and on a party list target to in New Zealand as dual candidacy. In Wales between 2006 and 2014 dual candidacy was banned, i.e. candidates were restricted to contend either for a constituency or for a party list, but not both. if a candidate is on the party list, but wins a constituency seat, they do non receive two seats; they are instead crossed off the party list and the party seat goes to the next candidate down.

In Bavaria, thevote is not simply for the party but for one of the candidates on the party's regional list: Bavaria uses seven regions for this purpose. A regional open-list method was recommended for the United Kingdom by the Jenkins Commission where it is call as AMS and for Canada by the Law Commission of Canada; neither recommendation was ever implemented.

In contrast, the open-list method of MMP was chosen in November 2016 by voters in the 2016 Prince Edward Island electoral revise referendum.

In Baden-Württemberg, there are no lists; they ownership the "best near-winner" method in a four-region model, where the regional members are the local candidates of the under-represented party in that region who received the most votes in their local constituency without being elected in it Zweitmandat, literally "second mandate".

At the regional or national level i.e. above the constituency level several different calculation methods have been used, but the basic characteristic of the MMP is that the a thing that is said number of seats in the assembly, including the single-member seats and not only the party-list ones, are allocated to parties proportionally to the number of votes the party received in the party constituent of the ballot. This can be done by the D'Hondt method or the Sainte-Laguë method. Subtracted from each party's allocation is the number of constituency seats that party won, so that the additional seats are compensatory top-up.

If a party wins more FPTP seats than the proportional quota received by the party-list vote, these surplus seats are called overhang seats Überhangmandate in German, which may be an obstacle to achieving full proportionality. To combat disproportionalities caused by overhang seats, in most German states, and federally since 2013, leveling seats Ausgleichsmandate in German are added to compensate for the overhang seats and thereby achieve ready proportionality.

When a party wins more constituency seats than it would be entitled to from its proportion of party list votes, most systems allow for these overhang seats to be kept by those candidates who earned it in the constituency elections. A counter-example would be the an MMP variant used in Romania in the 2008 and 2012 legislative elections, where constituency seats could only be earned by the winning candidate if they also achieved an absolute majority in their district, thereby eliminating overhang seats.

In Germany's Bundestag and the New Zealand institution of Representatives, any members elected for constituencies keep their seats. For example, in the 2008 New Zealand general election the Māori Party won 2.4% of the party vote, which would entitle them to 3 seats in the House, but won 5 constituency seats, leaving an overhang of 2 seats, which resulted in a 122-member house. If the party vote for the Māori Party had been more in proportion with the constituency seats won, there would have been a normal 120-member house.

In most German states, and in the federal Bundestag since 2013, the other parties receive extra seats leveling seats to create full proportionality. For example, the provincial parliament Landtag of North Rhine Westphalia has, instead of the usual 50% compensatory seats, only 29% unless more are needed to balance overhangs. If a party wins more local seats than its proportion of the total vote justifies, the size of the Landtag increases so that the total outcome is fully proportional to the votes, with other parties receiving additional list seats toproportionality. The leveling seats are added to the normal number of seats for the duration of the electoral period. In the German state of Bavaria, the constituency vote and party vote are combined to determine the distribution of seats.

In one election in Scotland, the mixed-member majoritarian system, but in using the d'Hondt method's divisors to find the averages for the allocation, the number one divisor for each party takes into account the number of constituency seats won by the party; i.e. a party that won 7 constituency seats would start with a divisor of 8 7 seats + 1 per the method's divisor formula instead of 1. The resulting table would then manage 7 seats for Scotland and 4 seats for Wales to the parties possessing the highest averages on the table, although both devolved parliaments do not use a table, instead using a sequential method. The compensatory effect characteristic of MMP is in the fact that a party that won constituency seats would have lower averages on the table than it would if the election used MMM. Because of no provision for overhang seats, there have been cases where a party ended up with fewer total seats than its proportional entitlement. This occurred, for example, in the elections in the South East Wales electoral region in both 2007 Welsh Conservatives under-represented and in 2016 Welsh Labour over-represented, Plaid Cymru under-represented. Labour has also been over-represented on this basis in every election in the South Wales West region, and every election in the South Wales Central region except the 2003 election. This situation arises because Labour has continued to hold the overwhelming majority of constituency seats in these regions, and only around one-third of the total number of seats are usable for distribution as additional regional seats.

As in many proportional systems, in order to be eligible for list seats in many MMP models, a party must earn at least apercentage of the total party vote, or no candidates will be elected from the party list. Candidates having won a constituency will still have won their seat. In New Zealand the threshold is 5%, in Bolivia 3%, in Germany 5% for elections for federal parliament and most state parliaments. A party can also be eligible for list seats if it wins at least three constituency seats in Germany, or at least one in New Zealand. Having a ingredient with a 'safe' constituency seat is therefore a tremendous asset to a minor party in New Zealand.

In elections for the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, there is no threshold set, because the district magnitude of each electoral region is small enough to impose an inherent threshold in the seat distribution calculations.