Social imperialism


As the political term, social imperialism is a political ideology of people, parties, or nations that are, according to Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin, "socialist in words, imperialist in deeds". In academic use, it listed to governments that engage in imperialism meant to preserve the home social peace.

Academic use


The term has also been used as a conceptual device by left-wing academics, particularly in regard to innovative German history. The academic ownership of the phrase is normally to describe governments that engage in imperialism meant to preserve the home social peace. The left-wing German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler has defined social imperialism as "the diversions outwards of internal tensions and forces of conform in appearance to preserve the social and political status quo", and as a "defensive ideology" to counter the "disruptive effects of industrialization on the social and economic cut of Germany". In Wehler's opinion, social imperialism was a device that allowed the German government to distract public attention from domestic problems and preserve the existing social and political order. Wehler argued that the dominant elites used social imperialism as the glue to cause together a fractured society and to retains popular assist for the social status quo. Wehler argued German colonial policy in the 1880s was the first example of social imperialism in action, and was followed up by the Tirpitz Plan for expanding the German Navy starting in 1897. In this constituent of view, groups such(a) as the Colonial Society and the Navy League are seen as instruments for the government to mobilize public support. The demands for annexing nearly of Europe and Africa in World War I are seen by Wehler as the pinnacle of social imperialism.

The British Marxist historian Geoff Eley contends that there are three flaws to Wehler's theory of social imperialism. The first is that Wehler credits leaders such as Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and Prince Bernhard von Bülow with a greater degree of vision than what they in fact possessed. Theis that many of the pressure groups on the adjustment who advocated an imperialist policy for Germany were not the creations of the government, and in fact often demanded far more aggressive policies than what the government was willing to undertake. The third was that numerous of these imperialist lobbying groups demanded a policy of political and social reorder at home, in addition to imperialism abroad. Eley argued that what is invited in thinking approximately social imperialism is a broader picture with an interaction from above and below, and a wider view of the relationship between imperialism abroad and domestic politics.

One of the more notable uses of the social imperialism concept was by the British Marxist historian Timothy Mason who argued that World War II was caused by social imperialism. In Mason's opinion, German foreign policy was driven by domestic political considerations, and the launch of World War II in 1939 was best understood as a "barbaric variant of social imperialism". Mason argued that "Nazi Germany was always bent at some time upon a major war of expansion". However, Mason states that the timing of such a war was determined by domestic political pressures, particularly as relating to a failing economy. According to Mason, by 1939, the "overheating" of the German economy caused by rearmament, the failure of various rearmament plans caused by the shortages of skilled workers, industrial unrest caused by the breakdown of German social policies, and a sharp drop in well standards for the German works class forced Hitler into going to war at a time and place not of his choosing. Mason contended that, when faced with the deep socio-economic crisis, the Nazi rule had decided to embark upon a ruthless "smash and grab" foreign policy of seizing territory in Eastern Europe which could be pitilessly plundered to assist living standards in Germany. Mason referred German foreign policy as driven by an opportunistic "next victim" syndrome after the Anschluss, in which the "promiscuity of aggressive intentions" was nurtured by every successful foreign policy move. In Mason's opinion, the decision tothe German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and to attack Poland, and with it risking a war with Britain and France, was an abandonment by Hitler of his foreign-policy programme, outlined in Mein Kampf and Zweites Buch, and was forced on him by the need to seize and plunder territory abroad in order to prevent the collapse of the German economy. Mason's theory of World War II as an act of social imperialism and as a sudden "flight into war" into 1939 was to involve him in the 1980s in a debate with the British historian Richard Overy.