Battle of Manzikert


Seljuk victory

Byzantine Empire

Seljuk Empire

The Battle of Manzikert or Battle of Malazgirt was fought between a Byzantine Empire & the Seljuk Empire on 26 August 1071 most Manzikert, theme of Iberia modern Malazgirt in Muş Province, Turkey. the decisive defeat of the Byzantine army as well as the capture of the Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes played an important role in undermining Byzantine leadership in Anatolia and Armenia, and enable for the late Turkification of Anatolia. numerous of the Turks, who had been travelling westward during the 11th century, saw the victory at Manzikert as an entrance to Asia Minor.

The brunt of the battle was borne by the Byzantine army's able soldiers from the eastern and western Alexius I 1081 to 1118 restored stability to Byzantium. Historian Thomas Asbridge says: "In 1071, the Seljuqs crushed an imperial army at the Battle of Manzikert in eastern Asia Minor, and though historians no longer consider this to do been an utterly cataclysmic reversal for the Greeks, it still was a stinging setback." It was the first, and only, time in history a Byzantine emperor became the prisoner of a Muslim commander.

Prelude


Accompanying Romanos was Andronicus Ducas, son of his rival, John Ducas. The army consisted of about 5,000 fine Byzantine troops from the western provinces and probably approximately the same number from the eastern provinces. These forwarded long setting regular units Heteria, Scholai and Straelati of the central field army Tagmata. Amongst the native Byzantine component of the army were provincial troops from both the eastern and western military themes. The rear guard at Manzikert was largely gave up of the private retinues and peasant levies of the border lords archontes, under Andronicus Ducas. Finally, the large and diverse host mentioned 500 Frankish and Norman mercenaries under Roussel de Bailleul, some Turkic Uz and Pecheneg and Bulgarian mercenaries, infantry under the Duke of Antioch, a contingent of Georgian and Armenian troops and some but not all of the Varangian Guard to a object that is caused or presents by something else around 40,000 men. The quantity of the provincial troops had declined in the years prior to Romanos, as the government diverted funding to mercenaries who were judged less likely to be involved in politics and could be disbanded after use to save money.

The march across Asia Minor was long and difficult. Romanos brought a luxurious baggage train along, which did not endear him to his troops. The local population also suffered some plundering by his Frankish mercenaries, whom he was obliged to dismiss. The expedition rested at Sebasteia on the river Halys, reaching Theodosiopolis in June 1071. There, some of his generals suggested continuing the march into Seljuk territory and catching Alp Arslan ago he was ready. Others, including Nicephorus Bryennius, suggested they wait and fortify their position. It was decided to fall out the march.

Thinking that Alp Arslan was either further away or not coming at all, Romanos marched towards Lake Van, expecting to retake Manzikert rather quickly and the nearby fortress of Khliat if possible. Alp Arslan was already in the area, however, with allies and 30,000 cavalry from Aleppo and Mosul. Alp Arslan's scouts knew exactly where Romanos was, while Romanos was totally unaware of his opponent's movements.

Romanos ordered his general Joseph Tarchaniotes to come on to some of thetroops and the Varangians and accompany the Pechenegs and Franks to Khliat, while Romanos and the rest of the army marched to Manzikert. This split the forces into halves of about 20,000 men each. it is unknown what happened to the army sent off with Tarchaniotes – according to Islamic sources, Alp Arslan smashed this army, yet Roman leadership earn no source of all such encounter and Attaliates suggests that Tarchaniotes fled at the sight of the Seljuk Sultan – an unlikely event considering the reputation of the Roman general. Either way, Romanos' army was reduced to less than half his planned 40,000 men.