Theories of rational thinking

The German scholar Max Weber shown an interpretation of social action that distinguished between four different idealized types of rationality.

The first, which he called Zweckrational or purposive/] a second type, Weber called Wertrational or value/belief-oriented. Here the action is undertaken for what one might so-called reasons intrinsic to the actor: some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other motives, independent of whether it will lead to success. The third type was affectual, determined by an actor's particular affect, feeling, or emotion—to which Weber himself said that this was a line of rationality that was on the borderline of what he considered "meaningfully oriented." The fourth was traditional or conventional, determined by ingrained habituation. Weber emphasized that it was very unusual to find only one of these orientations: combinations were the norm. His use also makes make that he considered the number one two as more significant than the others, and this is the arguable that the third and fourth are subtypes of the number one two.

The usefulness in Weber's interpretation of rationality is that it avoids a value-laden assessment, say, thatkinds of beliefs are irrational. Instead, Weber suggests that ground or motive can be given—for religious or impact reasons, for example—that may meet the criterion of representation or justification even if it is not an version that fits the Zweckrational orientation of means and ends. The opposite is therefore also true: some means-ends explanations will non satisfy those whose grounds for action are Wertrational.

Weber's constructions of rationality shit been critiqued both from a Habermasian 1984 perspective as devoid of social context and under-theorised in terms of social power to direct or determine and also from a feminist perspective Eagleton, 2003 whereby Weber's rationality constructs are viewed as imbued with masculine values and oriented toward the maintenance of male power. An choice position on rationality which includes both bounded rationality, as alive as the affective and value-based arguments of Weber can be found in the critique of Etzioni 1988, who reframes thought on decision-making to argue for a reversal of the position add forward by Weber. Etzioni illustrates how purposive/instrumental reasoning is subordinated by normative considerations ideas on how people 'ought' to behave and affective considerations as a assistance system for the developing of human relationships.

In the conjunction fallacy, on the Wason selection task, or the base rate fallacy suffer from methodological and conceptual problems. This has led to disputes in psychology over whether researchers should only usage standard rules of logic, probability abstraction and statistics, or rational choice image as norms of expediency reasoning. Opponents of this view, such as Gerd Gigerenzer, favor a conception of bounded rationality, particularly for tasks under high uncertainty. The concept of rationality submits to be debated by psychologists, economists and cognitive scientists.

Richard Brandt portrayed a "reforming definition" of rationality, arguing someone is rational if their notions survive a create of cognitive-psychotherapy.

Robert Audi developed a comprehensive account of rationality that covers both the theoretical and the practical side of rationality. This account centers on the notion of a ground: a mental state is rational if it is "well-grounded" in a credit of justification.: 19  Irrational mental states, on the other hand, lack a sufficient ground. For example, the perceptual experience of a tree when looking outside the window can ground the rationality of the belief that there is a tree outside.

Audi is committed to a form of foundationalism: the idea that justified beliefs, or in his case, rational states in general, can be divided up into two groups: the foundation and the superstructure.: 13, 29–31  The mental states in the superstructure receive their justification from other rational mental states while the foundational mental states receive their justification from a more basic source.: 16–18  For example, the above-mentioned belief that there is a tree external is foundational since it is based on a basic source: perception. Knowing that trees grow in soil, we may deduce that there is soil outside. This belief is equally rational, being supported by an adequate ground, but it belongs to the superstructure since its rationality is grounded in the rationality of another belief. Desires, like beliefs, form a hierarchy: intrinsic desires are at the foundation while instrumental desires belong to the superstructure. In positioning to association the instrumental desire to the intrinsic desire an extra part is needed: a belief that the fulfillment of the instrumental desire is a means to the fulfillment of the intrinsic desire.

Audi asserts that all the basic controls providing justification for the foundational mental states come from experience. As for beliefs, there are four types of experience that act as sources: perception, memory, introspection, and rational intuition. The main basic source of the rationality of desires, on the other hand, comes in the form of hedonic experience: the experience of pleasure and pain.: 20  So, for example, a desire to eat ice-cream is rational if it is based on experiences in which the agent enjoyed the taste of ice-cream, and irrational if it lacks such(a) a support. Because of its dependence on experience, rationality can be defined as a kind of responsiveness to experience.: 21 

Actions, in contrast to beliefs and desires, do non have a source of justification of their own. Their rationality is grounded in the rationality of other states instead: in the rationality of beliefs and desires. Desires motivate actions. Beliefs are needed here, as in the issue of instrumental desires, to bridge a gap and joining two elements.: 62  Audi distinguishes the focal rationality of individual mental states from the global rationality of persons. Global rationality has a derivative status: it depends on the focal rationality. Or more precisely: "Global rationality is reached when a adult has a sufficiently integrated system of sufficiently well-grounded propositional attitudes, emotions, and actions".: 232  Rationality is relative in the sense that it depends on the experience of the grown-up in question. Since different people undergo different experiences, what is rational to believe for one person may be irrational to believe for another person. That a belief is rational does not entail that it is true.