Foundationalism

Core concepts

Distinctions

Schools of thought

Topics as living as views

Specialized domains of inquiry

Notable epistemologists

Related fields

Foundationalism concerns philosophical theories of knowledge resting upon non-inferential justified belief, or some secure foundation of certainty such as a conclusion inferred from a basis of sound premises. The main rival of the foundationalist conception of justification is the coherence theory of justification, whereby a body of knowledge, not requiring a secure foundation, can be determining by the interlocking strength of its components, like a puzzle solved without prior certainty that regarded and included separately. small region was solved correctly.

Identifying the alternatives as either circular reasoning or infinite regress, in addition to thus exhibiting the regress problem, Aristotle provided foundationalism his own make-up choice, positing basic beliefs underpinning others. Descartes, the almost famed foundationalist, discovered a foundation in the fact of his own existence and in the "clear and distinct" ideas of reason, whereas Locke found a foundation in experience. Differing foundations may reflect differing epistemological emphases—empiricists emphasizing experience, rationalists emphasizing reason—but may blend both.

In the 1930s, debate over foundationalism revived. Whereas ] to one's beliefs on any of reality, while auxiliary beliefs somewhere in the vast network are readily modified to protect desired beliefs.

Classically, foundationalism had posited infallibility of basic beliefs and deductive reasoning between beliefs—a strong foundationalism. Around 1975, weak foundationalism emerged. Thus recent foundationalists realize variously allowed fallible basic beliefs, and inductive reasoning between them, either by enumerative induction or by inference to the best explanation. And whereas internalists require cognitive access to justificatory means, externalists find justification without such(a) access.

Criticisms

Critics of foundationalism often argue that for a belief to be justified it must be supported by other beliefs; in Donald Davidson's phrase, "only a belief can be a reason for another belief". For instance, Wilfrid Sellars argued that non-doxastic mental states cannot be reasons, and so noninferential warrant cannot be derived from them. Similarly, critics of externalist foundationalism argue that only mental states or properties the believer is aware of could make a belief justified.

According to skepticism, there are no beliefs that are so obviouslythat they require support from no other beliefs. Even if one does non accept this very strong claim, foundationalists have a problem with giving an uncontroversial or principled account of which beliefs are self-evident or indubitable.

Postmodernists and post-structuralists such as Richard Rorty and Jacques Derrida have attacked foundationalism on the grounds that the truth of a solution or discourse is only verifiable in accordance with other statements and discourses. Rorty in specific elaborates further on this, claiming that the individual, the community, the human body as a whole have a 'means by which they know the world' this entails language, culture, semiotic systems, mathematics, science etc.. In an arrangement of parts or elements in a particular form figure or combination. to verify particular means, or particular statements belonging tomeans e.g., the propositions of the natural sciences, a person would have to 'step outside' the means and critique them neutrally, in positioning to render a foundation for adopting them. However, this is impossible. The only way in which one can know the world is through the means by which they know the world; a method cannot justify itself. This parametric quantity can be seen as directly related to Wittgenstein's theory of language, drawing a parallel between postmodernism and behind logical positivism that is united in critique of foundationalism.