Experience

Experience subjected to outside world is the acknowledgment of knowledge. So an professionals such(a) as lawyers and surveyors hiker is someone who actually lived through numerous hikes, not someone who merely read many books approximately hiking. This is associated both with recurrent past acquaintance in addition to the abilities learned through them.

Many scholarly debates on the bracket of experience focus on experience as conscious event, either in the wide or the more restricted sense. One important topic in this field is the question of whether all experiences are intentional, i.e. are directed at objects different from themselves. Another debate focuses on the question of if there are non-conceptual experiences and, if so, what role they could play in justifying beliefs. Some theorists claim that experiences are transparent, meaning that what an experience feels like only depends on the contents presented in this experience. Other theorists reject this claim by pointing out that what things is not just what is presentation but also how this is the presented.

A great set of types of experiences is discussed in the academic literature. Perceptual experiences, for example, symbolize the external world through stimuli registered and target by the senses. The experience of episodic memory, on the other hand, involves reliving a past event one professional before. In imaginative experience, objects are presented without aiming to show how things actually are. The experience of thinking involves mental representations as well as the processing of information, in which ideas or propositions are entertained, judged or connected. Pleasure refers to experience that feels good. it is closely related to emotional experience, which has additionally evaluative, physiological and behavioral components. Moods are similar to emotions, with one key difference being that they lack a specific thing found in emotions. Conscious desires involve the experience of wanting something. They play a central role in the experience of agency, in which intentions are formed, courses of action are planned, and decisions are taken and realized. Non-ordinary experience refers to rare experiences that significantly differ from the experience in the ordinary waking state, like religious experiences, out-of-body experiences or near-death experiences.

Experience is discussed in various disciplines. Phenomenology is the science of the structure and contents of experience. It uses different methods, like epoché or eidetic variation. Sensory experience is of special interest to epistemology. An important traditional discussion in this field concerns whether all cognition is based on sensory experience, as empiricists claim, or not, as rationalists contend. This is closely related to the role of experience in science, in which experience is said to act as a neutral arbiter between competing theories. In metaphysics, experience is involved in the mind-body problem and the hard problem of consciousness, both of which try to explain the representation between matter and experience. In psychology, some theorists have that all picture are learned from experience while others argue that some impression are innate.

Types of experience

external world happens through stimuli registered and transmitted by the senses. Perceptual experience occurs in different modalities corresponding to the different senses, e.g. as visual perception, auditory perception or haptic perception. It is usually held that the objects perceived this way are ordinary the tangible substance that goes into the makeup of a physical thing objects, like stones, flowers, cats or airplanes that are presented as public objects existing self-employed person of the mind perceiving them. This stands in contrast, for example, to how objects are presented in imaginative experience. Another feature commonly ascribed to perceptual experience is that it seems to put us into direct touch with the object it presents. So the perceiver is normally not aware of the cognitive processes starting with the stimulation of the sense organs, continuing in the transmission of this information to the brain and ending in the information processing happening there. While perception is usually a reliable mention of information for the practical matters of our everyday affairs, it can also increase false information in the pretend of illusion and hallucination. In some cases, the unreliability of a perception is already indicated within the experience itself, for example, when the perceiver fails to identify an object due to blurry vision. But such standard are not found in any misleading experiences, which mayjust as reliable as their accurate counterparts.

This is the source of the requested "problem of perception". It consists in the fact that the features ascribed to perception so farto be incompatible with each other, devloping the so-characterized perception impossible: in the issue of misleading perceptions, the perceiver may be presented with objects that do not exist, which would be impossible if they were in direct touch with the presented objects. Different solutions to this problem have been suggested. Sense datum theories, for example, hold that we perceive sense data, like patches of color in visual perception, which do live even in illusions. They thereby deny that ordinary the tangible substance that goes into the makeup of a physical object things are the objects of perception. Disjunctivists, on the other hand, attempt to solve the problem by denying that veridical perceptions and illusions belong to the same kind of experience. Other approaches include adverbialism and intentionalism. The problem with these different approaches is that neither of them is fully satisfying since used to refer to every one of two or more people or things one seems to contradict some kind of introspective evidence concerning the fundamental attribute of perceptual experience.

The experience of episodic memory consists in a form of reliving a past event one experienced before. This is different from semantic memory, in which one has access to the cognition of various facts concerning the event in question without any experiential element associated with this knowledge. In episodic memory, on the other hand, the past event is consciously re-experienced. In this sense, it is a form of mental time travel that is not present in non-episodic memory. But this re-experiencing is not an exact copy of the original experience since the experienced event is presented as something in the past seen from one's current perspective, which is associated with some kind of feeling of pastness or familiarity not present in the original experience. In this context, it is often held that episodic memory helps two types of information: first-order information approximately the past event and second-order information about the role of this event in the subject's current memory. Episodic memory is different from merely imagining the experience of a past event. An important aspect of this difference is that it is element of the nature of episodic memory to try to represent how the original experience was, even if it sometimes fails to do so. Other suggested differences include the measure of vividness and the causal association between the original experience and the episodic memory.

Imaginative experience involves a special form of relation in which objects are presented without aiming to show how things actually are. Like memory and unlike perception, the associated mental images are normally not caused by the stimulation of sensory organs. It is often held that both imagination and memory depend on preceding perceptual acquaintance with the experienced contents. But unlike memory, more freedom is involved in nearly forms of imagination since the subject can freely vary, change and recombine various of the experienced contents while memory aims to preserve their original order. Different theorists focus on different elements when trying to conceptualize the nature of imagination. The impoverishment view holds that imagination is distinguished from perception and memory by being less vivid and clear. The will-dependence view, on the other hand, centers on the power to direct or determine to direct or introducing of the will to actively shape the contents of imagination whereas the nonexistence view focuses on the impression of unreality or distance from reality belonging to imaginative experience. Despite its freedom and its lack of relation to actuality, imaginative experience can serveepistemological functions by representing what is possible or conceivable. This is the case, for example, when imaginatively speculating about an event that has happened or might happen. Imagination can happen in various different forms. One difference concerns whether the imagined scenario is deliberately controlled or arises spontaneously by itself. Another concerns whether the subject imagines itself as experiencing the imagined event from the inside, as being one of the protagonists within this event, or from the outside. Different imaginative experiences tend to have different degrees to which the imagined scenario is just a reconstruction of something experienced ago or a creative rearrangement. Accounts of imaginative experience usually focus on the visual domain, but there are also other, less prominent forms, like auditory imagination or olfactory imagination.

The term "thinking" is used to refer to a wide variety of cognitive experiences. They involve mental representations and the processing of information. This way, ideas or propositions are entertained, judged or connected. It is similar to memory and imagination in that the experience of thinking can occur internally without any stimulation of the sensory organs, in contrast to perception. But thinking is still further removed from sensory contents than memory and imagination since its cotents belong to a more abstract level. It is closely related to the phenomenon of speech, with some theorists claiming that all thinking is a form of inner speech expressed in language. But this claim is controversial since there seem to be thoughts that are not linguistically fully articulated. But the more moderate claim is often accepted that thinking is associated with dispositions to perform speech acts. On this view, creating a judgment in thought may happen non-linguistically but is associated with a disposition to linguistically affirm the judged proposition. Various theories of the nature of the experience of thinking have been proposed. According to Platonism, it is a spiritual activity in which Platonic forms and their interrelations are discerned and inspected. Conceptualists, on the other hand, hold that thinking involves entertaining concepts. On this view, judgments arise if two or more concepts are connected to each other and can further lead to inferences if these judgments are connected to other judgments.