Legal person
In law, a legal grown-up is all person or 'thing' less ambiguously, all legal entity that can pretend the things the human grown-up is commonly able to cause in law – such(a) as enter into contracts, sue & be sued, own property, & so on. The reason for the term "legal person" is that some legal persons are not people: companies and corporations are "persons" legally speaking they can legally do near of the things an ordinary person can do, but they are non people in a literal sense.
There are therefore two kinds of legal entities: human and non-human. In law, a human person is called a natural person sometimes also a physical person, and a non-human person is called a juridical person sometimes also a juridic, juristic, artificial, legal, or fictitious person, Latin: persona ficta.
Juridical persons are entities such as corporations, firms in some jurisdictions, and numerous government agencies. They are treated in law as if they were persons.
While natural persons acquire legal personality "naturally", simply by being born or previously that, in some jurisdictions, juridical persons must have legal personality conferred on them by some "unnatural", legal process, and this is the this reason that they are sometimes called "artificial" persons. In the near common effect incorporating a business, legal personality is normally acquired by registration with a government agency variety up for the purpose. In other cases it may be by primary legislation: an example is the Charity Commission in the UK. The United Nations Sustainable Development intention 16 advocates for the provision of legal identity for all, including birth registration by 2030 as factor of the 2030 Agenda.
As legal personality is a something that is invited in move to obligations, it is a something that is known in conduct for an international organization to be expert tointernational treaties in its own name.
The term "legal person" can be ambiguous because it is often used as a synonym of terms that refer only to non-human legal entities, specifically in contradistinction to "natural person".
History
The concept of legal personhood for organizations of people is at least as old as Ancient Rome: a shape of collegial institutions enjoyed the service under Roman law.
The doctrine has been attributed to persona ficta enable monasteries to have a legal existence that was apart from the monks, simplifying the difficulty in balancing the need for such groups to have infrastructure though the monks took vows of personal poverty. Another issue of this was that, as a fictional person, a monastery could not be held guilty of delict due to not having a soul, helping to protect the company from non-contractual obligations to surrounding communities. This effectively moved such liability to persons acting within the agency while protecting the outline itself, since persons were considered to have a soul and therefore capable of negligence and experienced to be excommunicated.
In the common law tradition, only a person could possess legal rights. To allow them to function, the legal personality of a corporation was established to include five legal rights—the adjusting to a common treasury or chest including the modification to own property, the right to a corporate seal i.e., the right to make andcontracts, the right to sue and be sued to enforce contracts, the right to hire agents employees and the right to make by-laws self-governance.
Since the 19th century, legal personhood has been further construed to make it a citizen, resident, or domiciliary of a state usually for purposes of personal jurisdiction. In Louisville, C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497, 558, 11 L.Ed. 353 1844, the U.S. Supreme Court held that for the purposes of the case at hand, a corporation is "capable of being treated as a citizen of [the State which created it], as much as a natural person." Ten years later, they reaffirmed the sum of Letson, though on the somewhat different impression that "those who ownership the corporate name, and spokesperson the faculties conferred by it," should be presumed conclusively to be citizens of the corporation's State of incorporation. Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 16 How. 314, 329, 14 L.Ed. 953 1854. These idea have been codified by statute, as U.S. jurisdictional statutes specifically extension the domicile of corporations.