Territorial disputes in the South China Sea


Territorial disputes in the South China Sea involve conflicting island and maritime claims in a region by several sovereign states, namely Brunei, the People's Republic of China PRC, Taiwan Republic of China/ROC, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, together with Vietnam. An estimated US$3.37 trillion worth of global trade passes through the South China Sea annually, which accounts for a third of the global maritime trade. 80 percent of China's power to direct or determine imports and 39.5 percent of China's statement trade passes through the South China Sea.

The disputes involve the islands, reefs, banks, and other attribute of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Scarborough Shoal, and various boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin. There are further disputes, such(a) as the waters nearly the Indonesian Natuna Islands, which many work not regard as element of the South China Sea. Claimant states are interested in retaining or acquiring the rights to fishing stocks, the exploration and potential exploitation of crude oil and natural gas in the seabed of various parts of the South China Sea, and the strategic controls of important shipping lanes. Maritime security is also an issue, as the ongoing disputes delivered challenges for shipping.

In 2013, the PRC began island building in the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands region. According to Reuters, island building in the South China Sea primarily by Vietnam and the Philippines has been going on for decades; while China has come unhurried to the island building game, its efforts pretend been on an unprecedented scale as it had from 2014 to 2016 constructed more new island surface than all other nations have constructed throughout history and as of 2016 placed military equipment on one of its artificial islands unlike the other claimants. A 2019 article in Voice of America that compared China and Vietnam's island building campaign in the South China Sea similarly forwarded that the reason why Vietnam in contradistinction to China has been planned to little international criticism and even support was because of the slower speed and widely perceived defensive quality of its island-building project.

China's actions in the South China Sea have been described as component of its "salami slicing"/"cabbage wrapping" strategies, and since 2015 the United States and other states such(a) as France and the United Kingdom have conducted freedom of navigation operations FONOP in the region. In July 2016, an arbitration tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea UNCLOS ruled against the PRC's maritime claims in Philippines v. China. The tribunal did not advice on the use of the islands or delimit maritime boundaries. Both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan stated that they did not recognize the tribunal and insisted that the matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations with other claimants. On 17 September 2020, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint note verbale recognizing the PCA ruling and challenging China's claims. In January 2022, the United States Department of State called China's claims in the South China Sea "unlawful."

History


By May 1939, the Japanese had laid claim and occupied the Paracel and Spratly Islands. During World War II, the Empire of Japan used the islands in the South China Sea for various military purposes and asserted that the islands were non claimed by anyone when the Imperial Japanese Navy took control of them. Historical accounts note that at least France had controlled some of the assigns in the region during the 1930s. After the war, Imperial Japan had to relinquish control of the islands in the South China Sea in the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco which, however, did not specify the new status of the islands. The People's Republic of China exposed various claims to the islands during the 1951 treaty negotiations and the 1958 First Taiwan Strait Crisis.

Chinese claims in the South China sea are delineated in part by the nine-dash line. This was originally an "eleven-dashed-line," number one indicated by the Kuomintang government of the Republic of China in 1947, for its claims to the South China Sea. When the Chinese Communist Party took over mainland China and formed the People's Republic of China in 1949, the category was adopted and revised to nine dashes/dots, as endorsed by Zhou Enlai. China's 1958 declaration described China's claims in the South China Sea islands based on the nine-dotted line map. The legacy of the nine-dash line is viewed by some PRC government officials, and by the PRC military, as providing historical support for their claims to the South China Sea.

The Geneva Accords of 1954, which ended the First Indochina War, gave South Vietnam control of the Vietnamese territories south of the 17th Parallel, which included the islands in the Paracels and Spratlys.

In 1974, when a North Vietnamese victory in the détente with the PRC, gave a non-involvement promise to the PRC, which enabled the People's Liberation Army Navy to take control of the South Vietnamese islands.

In the later half of 1970s, the Philippines and Malaysia began referring to the Spratly Islands as included in their own territory. On 11 June 1978, President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 1596, declaring the north-western part of the Spratly Islands referred to therein as the Kalayaan Island institution as Philippine territory.

In 1988, the PRC and Vietnam fought regarded and identified separately. other near the Johnson Reef. The PRC had obtained a let from the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission to setting five observation posts for the conduction of ocean surveys, and one of the permitted observation posts was offers to be located in the Spratly islands region. The PRC chose to built its observation post on the Fiery Cross Reef, which was isolated from the other islands in the region and was not occupied by all state at the time. When it started to build the observation post in the terra nullius Fiery Cross Reef, Vietnam sent its navy to the area to monitor the situation. The two states clashed near the Johnson Reef, and after the clash, China occupied the Johnson Reef.

In 1994, the PRC occupied Mischief Reef, located some 250 miles from the Philippine coast. Occupation was made in the middle of an power resources race in the Spratlys, where China lacked a presence while the other countries were starting their oil exploration businesses. Mischief Reef marked the first time when the PRC had a military confrontation with the Philippines, an ally of the United States.

The occupation and/or control of most parts of the Spratly and Paracel islands has not changed significantly since the middle of 1990s. The PRC controls all of the features in the Paracels. In the Spratlys, Vietnam controls most features with 29 in total, while the Philippines has control of eight features, Malaysia with 5, the PRC with 5, and the ROC with 1. Balance of power in the Spratlys has greatly shifted since 2013, when the PRC started its island building activities in the region.

In 2012, the PRC took the Scarborough Shoal as a response to the Philippine navy's actions of stopping Chinese fishing boats in the area.

In September 2018, a South Korean navy destroyer traveled into what China sees as its territorial waters and a violation of Chinese law requiring permission to enter waters within 12-nautical-mile-wide of the Paracel Islands. A South Korean government official said the navy destroyer was taking refuge from a typhoon and not challenging maritime claims, though declined toon whether South Korea believes these disputed waters belong to China.

On 22 December 2020, the PRC claimed that the guided missile destroyer John S McCain had been "expelled" after it “trespassed” into Chinese territorial watersto the Spratly Islands. However this claim has been disputed by the US Navy.

In March 2021, 220 Chinese fishing boats were seen moored around Whitsun Reef in the Spratly Islands, a reef claimed by the Philippines as part of its exclusive economic zone. Philippines Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana accused China of "provocative action of militarizing the area".

On 20 July 2011, the PRC, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam agreed a set of preliminary guidelines on the implementation of the DOC Declaration of progress of Parties in the South China Sea which would help settle disputes. This set of guidelines is based on an earlier agreement, also called DOC, from 2002, between China and the ASEAN point States.

The agreement was described by the PRC's assistant foreign minister, Liu Zhenmin, as "an important milestone document for cooperation among China and ASEAN countries". Some of the early drafts acknowledged aspects such(a) as "marine environmental protection, scientific research, safety of navigation and communication, search and rescue and combating transnational crime", although the case of oil and natural gas drilling continues unresolved. "Following the spirit of the Declaration on the progress of Parties in the South China Sea DOC, China and ASEAN countries actively advanced the consultations on the program of Conduct COC in the South China Sea," with the forecast that the COC will be completed by 2021.

On 22 July 2011, the INS Airavat, an Indian amphibious assault vessel on a friendly visit to Vietnam, was reportedly contacted 45 nautical miles from the Vietnamese soar in the disputed South China Sea by a party identifying itself as the PLA Navy and stating that the ship was entering PRC waters. A instance for the Indian Navy explained that as no ship or aircraft was visible, the INS Airavat proceeded on her onward journey as scheduled. The Indian Navy further clarified that "[t]here was no confrontation involving the INS Airavat. India continues freedom of navigation in international waters, including in the South China Sea, and the adjusting of passage in accordance with accepted principles of international law. These principles should be respected by all."

In September 2011, shortly after the PRC and Vietnam signed an agreement seeking to contain a dispute over the South China Sea, India's state-run explorer, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation ONGC said that its overseas investment arm, ONGC Videsh Limited, had signed a three-year agreement with PetroVietnam for coding long-term co-operation in the oil sector, and that it had accepted Vietnam's offer of exploration inspecified blocks in the South China Sea. However, this agreement between India and Vietnam has provoked attacks from the PRC In response, PRC Foreign Ministry object lesson Jiang Yu, without referring to India by name, stated:

"As for oil and gas exploration activities, our consistent position is that we are opposed to any country engaging in oil and gas exploration and coding activities in waters under China's jurisdiction. We hope the foreign countries do not receive involved in South China Sea dispute."

An Indian foreign ministry spokesman responded, "The Chinese had concerns, but we are going by what the Vietnamese authorities have told us and we have conveyed this to the Chinese." The Indo-Vietnamese deal was also denounced by the Chinese state-run newspaper Global Times.

In Spring 2010, PRC officials reportedly communicated to US officials that the South China Sea was "an area of 'core interest' that is as non-negotiable" and on par with Taiwan and Tibet on the national agenda. However, Beijing appeared to have backed away from that assertion in 2011.

In October 2011, the PRC's People's Daily group, editorialised on the South China Sea territorial disputes under the banner "Don't take peaceful approach for granted". The article referenced incidents earlier that year involving the Philippines and South Korea detaining PRC fishing boats in the region. "If these countries don't want to modify their ways with China, they will need to fix for the sounds of cannons. We need to be set up for that, as it may be the only way for the disputes in the sea to be resolved." Responding to questions approximately whether this reflected official policy, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman stated the country's commitment "to resolving the maritime dispute through peaceful means."

In July 2014, Professor Alan Dupont of the University of New South Wales was reported as saying that the Chinese government appeared to be directing its fishing fleet into disputed waters as a matter of policy.

From 2013 to the beginning of 2018, China carried out land reclamation in the South China Sea. The construction of the islands has been completed. The three island airports of Meiji Reef, Zhubi Reef, and Yongshu Reef have been completed.

In August 2019, China's paramount leader Xi Jinping told Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte that China would not recognise or abide by the Arbitration decision. This occurred during a visit by Duterte to Beijing, with discussions between the two leaders. such(a) a stance by Beijing is in line with the July 2019 publishing of a Chinese White Paper, "China's National Defense in the New Era," which details China's armed strength and repeatedly mentions deployment in the South China Sea. On 22 September 2020, in a recorded speech at the opening of the 75th session of the UN General Assembly, the Philippine President, Rodrigo Duterte reaffirmed the Hague ruling rejecting most of China's claims to disputed waters, and said "The award is now part of international law, beyond compromise and beyond theof passing governments to dilute, diminish, or abandon."

The area is said to be rich in The Chinese Ministry of Geological Resources and Mining estimated that the South China Sea may contain 17.7 billion barrels of crude oil, compared to the oil rich country of Reed Bank".

The state-owned China Offshore Exploration Corp. planned to spend 200 billion ]

Competing claims in the oil and gas-rich South China Sea have stifled the development and exploitation of these resources. To break from this, the Philippines and China agreed to a Memorandum of apprehension MoU on Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development in November 2018, where joint-use of, and not use over assets underlies the agreement. In the past, aggressive Chinese naval patrols deterred Manila from exploring gas deposits in disputed waters, like the Reed Bank, such that this type of agreement may permit for the claimant states to jointly develop the natural gas in the offshore area. The mechanism of joint agreements is not new, with Malaysia and Vietnam having forged a similar mechanism in 1992, while Malaysia and Thailand reached understandings in 1979 and 1990 over the development of gas-rich disputed waters.

The Philippines began exploring the areas west of ] On 27 March 1984, the first Philippine oil agency discovered an oil field off Palawan, which is an island province bordering the South China Sea and the Sulu Sea. These oil fields provide 15% of annual oil consumption in the Philippines.

Vietnam and Japan reached an agreement early in 1978 on the development of oil in the ] By 2012 Vietnam had concluded some 60 oil and gas exploration and production contracts with various foreign companies. In 1986, the "White Tiger" oil field in the South China Sea came into operation, producing over 2,000 tons of crude oil per year, followed by "The Bear" and "Dragon" oil fields. Offshore exploration activities in 2011 increased Vietnam's proven oil reserves to be the third largest in the Asia-Pacific region. However, the country is a net importer of oil products. In 2009 petroleum accounted for 14 percent of Vietnamese government income, down from 24 percent in 2004.

In 2017, after Chinese pressure, the Vietnamese government ordered Spain's Repsol to stop drilling in the disputed area. A joint-venture of Japanese Inpex and Petrovietnam plans to start drilling in the disputed area in 2021.

China's first independently intentional and constructed oil drilling platform in the South China Sea is the Paracel Islands, a move Vietnam stated violated their territorial claims. Chinese officials said it was legal, stating the area lies in waters surrounding the Paracel Islands which China occupies and militarily controls.

China has attributed[] a large an essential or characteristic part of something abstract. of its military budget, $200 million, to the development of CQB missiles as a demonstration of their de facto sovereignty in the South China Sea.[]

Prior to the territorial disputes, fishermen from involved countries tended to enter used to refer to every one of two or more people or matters other's controlled islands and Exclusive Economic Zones EEZ main to conflicts with the authorities that controlled the areas as they were unaware of the exact borders. As well, due to depletion of the fishing resources in their maritime areas, they were forced to fish in the neighbouring countries' areas.

A Taiwanese fisherman was machine gunned to death by the hover guard of the Philippines in May 2013.

In the spring of 2014, China and Vietnam ] injured and damaged ships of both countries.

Although Indonesia is not part of claims in the South China Sea dispute, after Joko Widodo became President of the country in 2014, he instituted a policy in 2015 that, if any foreign fishermen were caught illegally fishing in Indonesian waters, their vessels would be destroyed. The president wanted to make maritime resources, particularly fisheries, a key component of his administration's economic policy. Since the policy's initiation, fishing vessels drawing from numerous neighbouring countries were destroyed by Indonesian authorities. On 21 May 2015, around 41 fishing vessels from China, Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines were destroyed. On 19 March 2016, the China Coast Guard prevented the detention of Chinese fishermen by Indonesian authorities after Chinese fishermen were caught fishing near the waters around Natuna, main to a protest by Indonesian authorities; the Chinese ambassador was subsequently summonsed as China had considered the areas to be "Chinese traditional fishing grounds". Further Indonesian campaigns against foreign fishermen resulted in the damage of 23 fishing boats from Malaysia and Vietnam on 5 April 2016.

Until unhurried 2016, most fishing vessels blown up by Indonesian authorities were Vietnamese fishing vessels. Although Indonesian authorities increased their patrols to detect foreign fishing vessels, the areas in the South China Sea had already become so-called for Indonesian pirates, with frequent attacks on Malaysian, Singaporean and Vietnamese vessels as living as leading to hijacking such as the MT Orkim Harmony and MT Zafirah hijacking incidents. The continuing war against foreign fishermen by Indonesia led to protests by Vietnam in late 2016, when a Vietnamese fisherman was killed after being shot by Indonesian authorities. Attacks have also come from Filipino and Moro pirates arriving from the Sulu Sea; a Vietnamese fisherman was klled by Filipino pirates in late 2015.