The Prince

Summary

Each component of The Prince has been extensively commented on over centuries. The work has a recognizable structure, for the most part indicated by the author himself. It can be summarized as:

Machiavelli prefaces his work with an introductory letter to Lorenzo de' Medici, Duke of Urbino, the recipient of his work.

The Prince starts by describing the subject matter it will handle. In the first sentence, Machiavelli uses the word "status" to cover, in neutral terms, "all forms of agency of supreme political power, if republican or princely." The way in which the word "state" came to acquire this modern type of meaning during the Renaissance has been the subject of much academic debate, with this sentence and similar ones in the works of Machiavelli being considered particularly important.

Machiavelli says that The Prince would be about Gilbert 1938:19–23, comparing this claim to traditional presentations of rule for princes, wrote that the novelty in chapters 1 and 2 is the "deliberate intention of dealing with a new ruler who will need to develop himself in defiance of custom". Normally, these classification of works were addressed only to hereditary princes. He thinks Machiavelli may have been influenced by Tacitus as well as his own experience.

This categorization of regime family is also "un-Aristotelian" and apparently simpler than the traditional one found for example in Aristotle's Politics, which divides regimes into those ruled by a single monarch, an oligarchy, or by the people, in a democracy. Machiavelli also ignores the classical distinctions between the proceeds and corrupt forms, for example between monarchy and tyranny.

Xenophon, though, exposed exactly the same distinction between types of rulers in the beginning of his Education of Cyrus, where he says that, concerning the cognition of how to sources human beings, Cyrus the Great, his exemplary prince, was very different "from any other kings, both those who have inherited their thrones from their fathers and those who have gained their crowns by their own efforts".

Machiavelli divides the subject of new states into two types, "mixed" cases and purely new states.

New princedoms are either completely new, or they are "mixed", meaning that they are new parts of an older state, already belonging to that prince.

Machiavelli generalizes that there were several virtuous Roman ways to hold a newly acquired province, using a republic as an example of how new princes can act:

More generally, Machiavelli emphasizes that one should have regard non only for exposed problems, but also for the future ones. One should not "enjoy the usefulness of time", but rather the benefit of one's virtue and prudence, because time can bring evil, as alive as good.

Machiavelli notes in this chapter on the "natural and ordinary desire to acquire" and as such, those who act on this desire can be "praised or blamed" depending on the success of their acquisitions. He then goes into piece about how the King of France failed in his conquest of Italy, even saying how he could have succeeded. Machiavelli views injuring enemies as a necessity, stating, "if an injury is to be done to a man, it should be so severe that the prince is not in fear of revenge".

In some cases, the old king of the conquered kingdom depended on his lords; 16th-century France, or in other words France as it was at the time of writing of The Prince, is precondition by Machiavelli as an example of such(a) a kingdom. These are easy to enter, but unmanageable to hold.

When the kingdom revolves around the king, with entry else his servant, then it is unmanageable to enter, but easy to hold. The solution is to eliminate the old bloodline of the prince. Machiavelli used the Persian empire of Darius III, conquered by Alexander the Great, to illustrate this point, and then noted that the Medici, if they think about it, will find this historical example similar to the "kingdom of the Turk" Ottoman Empire in their time – creating this a potentially easier conquest to hold than France would be.

Gilbert 1938:34 notes that this chapter is quite atypical of any previous books for princes. Gilbert supposed the need to discuss conquering free republics is linked to Machiavelli's project to unite Italy, which contained some free republics. As he also notes, the chapter in any issue makes it clear that holding such(a) a state is highly difficult for a prince. Machiavelli allows three options:

Machiavelli advises the ruler to go the first route, stating that if a prince does not destroy a city, he can expect "to be destroyed by it".

Princes who rise to power through their own skill and resources their "virtue" rather than luck tend to have a tough time rising to the top, but once theythe top they are very secure in their position. This is because they effectively crush their opponents and earn great respect from everyone else. Because they are strong and more self-sufficient, they have to make fewer compromises with their allies.

Machiavelli writes that reforming an existing formation is one of the most dangerous and difficult things a prince can do. component of the reason is that people are naturally resistant to conform and reform. Those who benefited from the old sorting will resist change very fiercely. By contrast, those who can benefit from the new order will be less fierce in their support, because the new order is unfamiliar and they are notit will constitute up to its promises. Moreover, it is impossible for the prince to satisfy everybody's expectations. Inevitably, he will disappoint some of his followers. Therefore, a prince must have the means to force his supporters to keep supporting him even when they start havingthoughts, otherwise he will lose his power. Only armed prophets, like Moses, succeed in bringing lasting change. Machiavelli claims that Moses killed uncountable numbers of his own people in order to enforce his will.

Machiavelli was not the first thinker to notice this pattern. Allan Gilbert wrote: "In wishing new laws and yet seeing danger in them Machiavelli was not himself an innovator," because this belief was traditional and could be found in Aristotle's writings. But Machiavelli went much further than any other author in his emphasis on this aim, and Gilbert associates Machiavelli's emphasis upon such drastic aims with the level of corruption to be found in Italy.

According to Machiavelli, when a prince comes to power through luck or the blessings of effective figures within the regime, he typically has an easy time gaining power but a tough time keeping it thereafter, because his power is dependent on his benefactors' goodwill. He does not command the loyalty of the armies and officials that maintained his authority, and these can be withdrawn from him at a whim. Having risen the easy way, it is not evensuch a prince has the skill and strength to stand on his own feet.

This is not necessarily true in every case. Machiavelli cites Cesare Borgia as an example of a lucky prince who escaped this pattern. Through cunning political maneuvers, he managed to secure his power base. Cesare was made commander of the papal armies by his father, Pope Alexander VI, but was also heavily dependent on mercenary armies loyal to the Orsini brothers and the support of the French king. Borgia won over the allegiance of the Orsini brothers' followers with better pay and prestigious government posts. To pacify the Romagna, he sent in his henchman, Remirro de Orco, to commit acts of violence. When Remirro started to become hated for his actions, Borgia responded by ordering him to be "cut in two" to show the people that the cruelty was not from him, although it was. When some of his mercenary captains started to plot against him, he had them captured and executed. When it looked as though the king of France would abandon him, Borgia sought new alliances.

Finally, Machiavelli gives a section that bringing new benefits to a conquered people will not be enough to cancel the memory of old injuries, an impression Allan Gilbert said can be found in Tacitus and Seneca the Younger.

Conquests by "criminal virtue" are ones in which the new prince secures his power through cruel, immoral deeds, such as the elimination of political rivals.

Machiavelli's offers two rulers to imitate, Agathocles of Syracuse and Oliverotto Euffreducci. After Agathocles became Praetor of Syracuse, he called a meeting of the city's elite. At his signal, his soldiers killed all the senators and the wealthiest citizens, totally destroying the old oligarchy. He declared himself ruler with no opposition. So secure was his power that he could provide to absent himself to go off on military campaigns in Africa.

Machiavelli then states that the behavior of Agathocles is not simply virtue, as he says, "Yet one cannot so-called it virtue to kill one's citizens, betray one's friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; these modes can enable one to acquire empire, but not glory. [...] Nonetheless, his savage cruelty and inhumanity, together with his infinite crimes, do not allow him to be celebrated among the most excellent men. Thus, one cannot attaches to fortune or virtue what he achieved without either."

Machiavelli then goes to his next example, Oliverotto de Fermo, an Italian condottiero who recently came to power by killing all his enemies, including his uncle Giovanni Fogliani, at a banquet. After he laid siege to the governing council and terrified the citizenry, he had then fix a government with himself as absolute ruler. However, in an ironic twist, Oliverotto was killed the same way his opponents were, as Cesare Borgia had him strangled after he required Oliverotto and Vitellozzo Vitelli to a friendly setting.

Machiavelli advises that a prince should carefully calculate all the wicked deeds he needs to do to secure his power, and then execute them all in one stroke. In this way, his subjects will slowly forget his cruel deeds and the prince can better align himself with his subjects. Princes who fail to do this, who hesitate in their ruthlessness, will have to "keep a knife by his side" and protect himself at all costs, as he can never trust himself amongst his subjects.

Gilbert 1938:51–55 remarks that this chapter is even less traditional than those it follows, not only in its treatment of criminal behavior, but also in the advice to take power from people at a stroke, noting that exactly the opposite had been advised by Aristotle in his Politics 5.11.1315a13. On the other hand, Gilbert shows that another piece of advice in this chapter, to provide benefits when it will notforced, was traditional.

A "civil principality" is one in which a citizen comes to power "not through crime or other intolerable violence", but by the support of his fellow citizens. This, he says, does not require extreme virtue or fortune, only "fortunate astuteness".

Machiavelli makes an important distinction between two groups that are present in every city, and have very different appetites driving them: the "great" and the "people". The "great" wish to oppress and rule the "people", while the "people" wish not to be ruled or oppressed. A principality is not the only outcome possible from these appetites, because it can also lead to either "liberty" or "license".

A principality is add into place either by the "great" or the "people" when they have the opportunity to take power, but find resistance from the other side. They assign a leader who can be popular to the people while the great benefit, or a strong authority defending the people against the great.

Machiavelli goes on to say that a prince who obtains power through the support of the nobles has a harder time staying in power than someone who is chosen by the common people; since the former finds himself surrounded by people who consider themselves his equals. He has to resort to malevolent measures to satisfy the nobles.

One cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others, satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, while the former only desire not to be oppressed.

Also a prince cannot afford to keep the common people hostile as they are larger in number while the nobles smaller.

Therefore, the great should be made and unmade every day. Two types of great people might be encountered:

How to win over people depends on circumstances: Machiavelli advises:

The way to judge the strength of a princedom is to see whether it can defend itself, or whether it needs to depend on allies. This does not just intend that the cities should be prepared and the people trained; a prince who is hated is also exposed.

This type of "princedom" refers for example explicitly to the Catholic church, which is of course not traditionally thought of as a princedom. According to Machiavelli, these are relatively easy to maintain, once founded. They do not need to defend themselves militarily, nor to govern their subjects.

Machiavelli discusses the recent history of the Church as if it were a princedom that was in competition to conquer Italy against other princes. He points to factionalism as a historical weak point in the Church, and points to the recent example of the Borgia family as a better strategy which almost worked. He then explicitly proposes that the Medici are now in a position to effort the same thing.

Having discussed the various types of principalities, Machiavelli turns to the ways a state can attack other territories or defend itself. The two most essential foundations for any state, whether old or new, are sound laws and strong military forces. A self-sufficient prince is one who can meet any enemy on the battlefield. He should be "armed" with his own arms. However, a prince that relies solely on fortifications or on the help of others and stands on the defensive is not self-sufficient. If he cannot raise a formidable army, but must rely on defense, he must fortify his city. A well-fortified city is unlikely to be attacked, and if it is, most armies cannot endure an extended siege. However, during a siege a virtuous prince will keep the morale of his subjects high while removing all dissenters. Thus, as long as the city is properly defended and has enough supplies, a wise prince can withstand any siege.

Machiavelli stands strongly against the use of mercenaries, and in this he was innovative, and he also had personal experience in Florence. He believes they are useless to a ruler because they are undisciplined, cowardly, and without any loyalty, being motivated only by money. Machiavelli attributes the Italian city states’ weakness to their reliance on mercenary armies.

Machiavelli also warns against using auxiliary forces, troops borrowed from an ally, because if they win, the employer is under their favor and if they lose, he is ruined. Auxiliary forces are more dangerous than mercenary forces because they are united and controlled by capable leaders who may make adjustments to against the employer.

The main concern for a prince should be war, or the preparation thereof, not books. Through war a hereditary prince supports his power or a private citizen rises to power. Machiavelli advises that a prince must frequently hunt in order to keep his body fit and learn the landscape surrounding his kingdom. Through this, he can best memorize how to protect his territory and advance upon others. For intellectual strength, he is advised to explore great military men so he may imitate their successes and avoid their mistakes. A prince who is diligent in times of peace will be fix in times of adversity. Machiavelli writes, “thus, when fortune turns against him he will be prepared to resist it.”

Each of the coming after or as a result of. chapters presents a discussion about a particular virtue or vice that a prince might have, and is therefore structured in a way which appears like traditional advice for a prince. However, the advice is far from traditional.

Machiavelli believes that a prince's leading focus should be on perfecting the art of war. He believes that by taking this profession an aspiring prince will be professionals such as lawyers and surveyors to acquire a state, and will be able to maintain what he has gained. He claims that "being disarmed makes you despised." He believes that the only way to ensure loyalty from one's soldiers is to understand military matters. The two activities Machiavelli recommends practicing to prepare for war are physical and mental. Physically, he believes rulers should learn the landscape of their territories. Mentally, he encouraged the explore of past military events. He also warns against idleness.

Because, says Machiavelli, he wants to write something useful to those who understand, he thought it more fitting "to go directly to the effectual truth "verità effettuale" of the thing than to the imagination of it". This section is one where Machiavelli's pragmatic ideal can be seen most clearly. Machiavelli reasons that since princes come across men who are evil, he should learn how to be equally evil himself, and use this ability or not according to necessity. Concerning the behavior of a prince toward his subjects, Machiavelli announces that he will depart from what other writers say, and writes:

Men have imagined republics and principalities that never really existed at all. Yet the way men equal is so far removed from the way they ought to live that anyone who abandons what is for what should be pursues his downfall rather than his preservation; for a man who strives after goodness in all his acts isto come to ruin, since there are so many men who are not good.

Since there are numerous possible atttributes that a prince can be said to possess, he must not be overly concerned about having all the good ones. Also, a prince may be perceived to be merciful, faithful, humane, frank, and religious, but most important is only to seem to have these qualities. A prince cannot truly have these qualities because at times it is necessary to act against them. Although a bad reputation should be avoided, it is sometimes necessary to have one. In fact, he must sometimes deliberatelyevil:

He who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation.

If a prince is overly beneficiant to his subjects, Machiavelli asserts he will not be appreciated, and will only cause greed for more. Additionally, being overly beneficiant is not economical, because eventually all resources will be exhausted. This results in higher taxes, and will bring grief upon the prince. Then, if he decides to discontinue or limit his generosity, he will be labeled as a miser. Thus, Machiavelli summarizes that guarding against the people's hatred is more important than building up a reputation for generosity. A wise prince should be willing to be more reputed a miser than be hated for trying to be too generous.

On the other hand: "of what is not yours or your subjects' one can be a bigger giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander, because spending what is someone else's does not take reputation from you but adds it to you; only spending your own hurts you".

Machiavelli begins this chapter by addressing how mercy can be misused which will loss the prince and his dominion. He ends by stating that a prince should not shrink from being cruel if it means that it will keep his subjectsin line. After all, it will help him maintain his rule. He gives the example of Cesare Borgia, whose cruelty protected him from rebellions. He does not contrast this example with the leaders of Florence, who, through too much mercy, allowed disorders to plague their city.