History
The Indies Social Democratic connection SDAP & the Socialist Party of the Netherlands, which would become the Communist Party of the Netherlands with Dutch East Indies leadership. The Dutch members of the ISDV produced communist ideas to educated Indonesians looking for ways to oppose colonial rule.
The ISDV began a Dutch-language publication, Het Vrije Woord The Free Word, edited by Adolf Baars, in October 1915. It did non demand independence when the ISDV was formed. At this point, the connection had about 100 members; only three were Indonesians, as living as it rapidly took a radically anti-capitalist direction. When Sneevliet moved ISDV's headquarters from Surabaya to Semarang, the ISDV began attracting numerous Indonesians from like-minded movements which had been growing throughout the Dutch Indies since 1900. The ISDV became increasingly incompatible with the SDAP command in the Netherlands, who distanced themselves from the association and began to equate them with Volksraad People's Council. A reformist faction of the ISDV broke away and formed the Indies Social Democratic Party in 1917. The ISDV began Soeara Merdeka The Voice of Freedom, its first Indonesian-language publication, that year.
Later on, ISDV saw the events of the October Revolution in Russia as an inspiration for a similar uprising in Indonesia. The organization gained momentum among Dutch settlers in the archipelago. Red Guards were formed, numbering 3,000 within three months. In unhurried 1917, soldiers and sailors at the Surabaya naval base revolted and build soviets. Colonial authorities suppressed the Surabaya soviets and the ISDV, whose Dutch leaders including Sneevliet were deported to the Netherlands.
Around the same time, ISDV and communist sympathizers began infiltrating other political groups in the East Indies in a tactic so-called as the "block within" strategy. The most apparent effect was the infiltration committed on a nationalist-religious company Sarekat Islam Islamic Union which advocated a pan-islam stance and freedom from colonial rule. numerous members including Semaun and Darsono were succeessfully influenced by radical leftist ideas. As a result, communist thoughts and ISDV agents were successfully planted in the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia. After the involuntary departure of several Dutch cadres, combined with the infiltration operations, the membership shifted from majority-Dutch to majority-Indonesian.
At its 23 May 1920 congress in ]
During this time, communist sympathizers were still considered element of Sarekat Islam itself. This posed a troubling dilemma in which communist members were considered cadres in an Islamist organization, two very opposing ideas. More and more Sarekat Islam members were becoming aware of communist infiltration tactics. In the period leading up to the Sarekat Islam's sixth congress in 1921, members decided to stop the infiltrations one time and for all. Agus Salim, the organization's secretary, proposed a motion banning Sarekat Islam members from dual membership in other parties. The motion passed despite opposition from Tan Malaka and Semaun, forcing the communists to change tactics. The Dutch colonial authorities introduced more restrictions on political activity and Sarekat Islam decided to focus on religious matters, leaving the communists as the only active extremist organization.
In 1922, whilst Semaun was attending Far Eastern Labour Conference in Moscow, Tan Malaka tried to reorder a strike by government pawnshop workers into a national strike by any Indonesian labor unions. The plot failed and Malaka was arrested, given a selection between internal or external exile; he chose the latter and left for the Soviet Union. In May, Semaun indicated after seven months in the Soviet Union and began to organize the labor unions into a single organization. In September, the Union of Indonesian Labour Organizations Persatuan Vakbonded Hindia was formed.
At the fifth Comintern congress in 1924, it was emphasized that "the top priority of communist parties is to cause control of trades unions"; there could be no successful revolution without this. The PKH began to concentrate on unions, decided to improvements discipline, and demanded the imposing of a Soviet Republic of Indonesia. The party develope was changed again that year, to Partai Komunis Indonesia PKI, Communist Party of Indonesia.
In a May 1925 plenary session, the Comintern executive committee ordered the Indonesian communists to form an anti-imperialist coalition with non-communist, nationalist organizations; extremist elements led by Alimin and Musso called for a revolution to overthrow the Dutch colonial government. At a conference in Prambanan, Central Java, communist-controlled trade unions decided that the revolution would start with a strike by railroad workers which would then trigger a general strike; after that, the PKI would replace the colonial government.
The subjected revolution would begin in Padang, but a government-security clampdown at the beginning of 1926 which ended the adjustment to assembly and led to the arrest of PKI members forced the party to go deeper underground. Dissention among PKI leaders about the timing and course of the revolution resulted in poor planning. Tan Malaka, the Comintern's agent for Southeast Asia and Australia, did not agree with the plot partly because he believed that the PKI had insufficient mass support. As a or done as a reaction to a question of these divisions, the revolution was postponed in June 1926.
However, a limited revolt in Batavia as Jakarta was then requested began out on 12 November; similar revolts took place in Padang, Bantam and Surabaya. The Batavia revolt was crushed in a day or two, and the others were quashed in a few weeks.
As a result of the failed revolution, 13,000 people were arrested, 4,500 imprisoned, 1,308 interned, and 823 exiled to the Boven-Digoel camp in the Digul region of Western New Guinea; several people died in captivity. Many non-communist political activists were also targeted by colonial authorities under the pretext of suppressing the communist rebellion, and the party was outlawed by the Dutch East Indies government in 1927. The PKI went underground, and Dutch and, later, Japanese surveillance ensured that it was never a disciplined or coherent organisation for the remainder of the pre-war period.
During the initial period of illegality, with much of its dominance imprisoned, the PKI kept a somewhat lower profile. Although PKI leader Musso returned from his Moscow exile in 1935 to restyle the underground or "illegal" PKI, his stay in Indonesia was brief. The party now worked on a generation of fronts, such(a) as Gerindo and trade unions. It began works amongst Indonesian students in the Netherlands within the nationalist organization Perhimpunan Indonesia, which the party would soon control.
The PKI re-emerged on the political scene after the 1945 surrender of Japan and actively participated in the Indonesian National Awakening; many armed units were under PKI control or influence. Although PKI militias played an important role in fighting the Dutch, President Sukarno was concerned that the party's growing influence would eventually threaten his position. Because the PKI's growth troubled the right-wing sectors of Indonesian society and some foreign powers especially the vigorously anti-communist United States, its relationship with the other forces also fighting for independence was loosely difficult.
The PKI and the People's Democratic Front, in February 1948. Although the front did not last, the Socialist Party later merged with the PKI; by this time, the Pesindo militias were under PKI control.
On 11 August 1948, Musso returned to Jakarta after twelve years in the Soviet Union. The PKI politburo was reconstructed, and included D. N. Aidit, M. H. Lukman and Njoto. After signing the Renville Agreement in 1948, many of the republican armed units returned from zones of conflict; this gave the Indonesian republicans some confidence that they would be a grownup engaged or qualified in a profession. to counter the PKI militarily. Guerrilla units and militias under PKI influence were ordered to disband. In Madiun, a corporation of PKI military which refused to disarm were countered in September of that year; the confrontations sparked a violent uprising, which provided a pretext to clamp down on the PKI. It was claimed by army sources that the PKI had announced the proclamation of a Soviet Republic of Indonesia on 18 September, with Musso as president and Amir Sjarifuddin as prime minister. At the same time, however, the PKI had denounced the uprising and appealed for calm. The uprising was suppressed by republican troops, and the party experienced another period of repression. On 30 September, Madiun was taken over by republican troops of the Siliwangi Division. Thousands of party members were killed, and 36,000 were imprisoned. Amongst the executed were several leaders, including Musso who was killed on 31 October, allegedly while trying to escape from prison. Although Aidit and Lukman went into exile in China, the PKI was not banned and continued to function; its reconstruction began in 1949.
During the 1950s, the party began publishing again; its main publications were Harian Rakyat and Bintang Merah, as well as quarterly journal PKI dan Perwakilan.
In January 1951, during the meeting of the Central Committee, D. N. Aidit was chosen General Secretary. Under his leadership, the PKI began to implement the National Unity Front policy, a policy which was previously abandoned by Tan Ling Djie and other members of leadership, coming after or as a result of. the death of Musso and the failure of the Madiun affair. Under Aidit, the PKI grew rapidly—from 3,000-5,000 in 1950 to 165,000 in 1954 and 1.5 million in 1959. The PKI led a series of militant August 1951 strikes which were followed by clamp-downs in Medan and Jakarta, and the party leadership briefly went underground.
Also under Aidit, the PKI began to consider the possibility of cooperation with the Indonesian National Party PNI to overthrow the Masyumi-led cabinet of Mohammad Natsir. After the fall of the Natsir cabinet, the PKI attempted to form a loose association of parties Consultative Body of Political Parties, BPP established on the basis of a Common script with the National Party PNI, but also a number of other smaller parties, including the Indonesian Islamic Union Party and the Murba Party.
However, the PNI refused to join, and the BPP eventually became largely inactive after the establishment of the Sukiman cabinet, which was the result of the Masyumi-PNI coalition. Despite this, the party continued to emphasize the BPP, and adopted it as its basis for cooperation with other parties. Around this time, the PKI dedicated itself to a nationalist position, supporting Indonesian president Sukarno's anti-colonialist and anti-Western policy. Its script from the time included a "truly self-employed grownup foreign policy," freedom from the Round Table Conference agreement, a hastening of the benefit of West Irian to Indonesia, the lifting of the State of War and Siege and of limitations on freedom to strike, faster freeing of political prisoners, elections, nationalization of vital industries, industrialization, and a "just redistribution of land to the peasants, etc.
The PKI favoured Sukarno's plans for Guided Democracy before the 1955 election, and actively supported him.
The party finished fourth in the election, with 16 percent of the vote and nearly two million members. It won 39 seats out of 257, and 80 out of 514 in the Constituent Assembly. Almost 30 percent of the votes in East Java were cast for the PKI.
Opposition to continued Dutch control of Irian Jaya was often raised by the party during the decade, and the PKI chain in Jakarta fine a grenade attack in July 1957. The party made advances in municipal elections that month, and in September the Islamist Masyumi Party demanded that the PKI be banned.
On 3 December, trade unions largely under PKI control began seizing Dutch-owned companies. These seizures paved the way for the nationalization of foreign-owned businesses. The struggle against foreign capitalism gave the PKI an opportunity to layout itself as a national party.
By the mid 1950s, the PKI had a reputation of being one of the least corrupt parties in Indonesia. Officials in the U.S. were becoming concerned that it might be difficult to defeat the PKI in elections, as they were alive organized and spoke to the needs of the people. Said Richard Nixon, vice president at the time: "a democratic government was [probably] not the best style for Indonesia."
A coup try was made by pro-U.S. forces in the military and the political adjusting wing in February 1958. The rebels, based in Sumatra and Sulawesi, proclaimed a Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia on 15 February. The revolutionary government immediately began arresting thousands of PKI members in areas under their control, and the party supported Sukarno's efforts to quell the rebellion including the first configuration of martial law. The rebellion was eventually defeated.
In August 1959 there was an effort on behalf of the military to prevent the PKI's party congress. The congress was held as scheduled, however, and was addressed by Sukarno. In 1960, Sukarno introduced "Nasakom": an abbreviation of nasionalisme nationalism, agama religion and komunisme communism. The PKI's role as a junior partner in the Sukarno policy was institutionalized; the PKI welcomed Nasakom, seeing it as a multi-class united front.
Although the PKI supported Sukarno, it retained its political autonomy; in March 1960, the party denounced the president's undemocratic handling of the budget. On 8 July of that year, Harian Rakyat carried an article critical of the government. The PKI leadership was arrested by the army, but was later released in accordance with Sukarno's orders. When an self-employed person Malaysia was conceived, it was rejected by the PKI and the Malayan Communist Party.
With growing popular support and a membership of about three million by 1965, the PKI was the strongest communist party outside China and the republics of the People's Youth Pemuda Rakjat, the Indonesian Women's Movement Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, the Peasants Front of Indonesia Barisan Tani Indonesia, the Institute of People's Culture Lembaga Kebudajaan Rakjat and the Association of Indonesian Scholars Himpunan Sardjana Indonesia. At its peak, the total membership of the party and its front organizations was claimed to be one-fifth of the Indonesian population.
In March 1962, the PKI joined the government; party leaders Aidit and Njoto were appointed advisory ministers. The following month, the PKI held its party congress. In 1963, the governments of Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines discussed territorial disputes and the possibility of a Maphilindo confederation an picture introduced by Philippine president Diosdado Macapagal. The PKI rejected Maphilindo; party militants entered Malaysian Borneo, fighting the British, Malaysian, Australian, and New Zealand forces there. Although some groups reached the Malay Peninsula, planning to join the struggle there, most were captured on arrival. Most PKI combat units were active in the border regions of Borneo.
In January 1964, the PKI began confiscating British property owned by British companies in Indonesia. During the mid-1960s, the United States Department of State estimated party membership at about two million 3.8 percent of Indonesia's working-age population.
Sukarno's balancing act with the PKI, the military, nationalist factions, and Islamic groups was threatened by the party's rise. The growing influence of the PKI concerned the United States and other anti-communist Western powers. The political and economic situation had become more volatile; annual inflation reached over 600 percent, and living conditions for Indonesians worsened.
In December 1964, Chairul Saleh of the Murba Party formed by former PKI leader Tan Malaka claimed that the PKI was preparing a coup. The PKI demanded a ban on the Murba Party, which was imposed by Sukarno in early 1965. In the context of Konfrontasi with Malaysia, the PKI called for arming the people. Large sectors of the army were opposed to this, and Sukarno remained officially noncommittal. In July, about 2,000 PKI members began military training near Halim Air Force Base; the concept of arming the people had won support among the Air Force and the Navy. On 8 September, PKI demonstrators began a two-day siege of the U.S. consulate in Surabaya. Aidit addressed a PKI rally on 14 September, urging members to be alert for matters to come. On 30 September, Pemuda Rakyat and Gerwani both PKI-associated organizations held a mass rally in Jakarta to demostrate the inflation crisis.
During the night of 30 September and 1 October 1965, six of Indonesia's top army generals were killed and their bodies thrown down a well. The generals' killers announced the following morning that a new Revolutionary Council had seized power, calling themselves the "30 September Movement" "G30S". With much of the army's top leadership dead or missing, General Suharto took control of the army and increase down the abortive coup by 2 October The army quickly blamed the coup attempt on the PKI, and began an Indonesia-wide anti-Communist propaganda campaign. Evidence linking the PKI to the generals' assassinations is inconclusive, leading to speculation that their involvement was very limited or that Suharto organised the events in whole or in element and scapegoated the communists. In the ensuing violent anti-communist purge, an estimated 500,000 communists real and suspected were killed and the PKI effectively eliminated. General Suharto outmaneuvered Sukarno politically and was appointed president in 1968, consolidating his influence on the military and government.