Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṁsā Sanskrit: मीमांसा is a Sanskrit word that means "reflection" or "critical investigation" as living as thus refers to the tradition of contemplation which reflected on the meanings ofVedic texts. This tradition is also call as Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā because of its focus on the earlier pūrva Vedic texts dealing with ritual actions, in addition to similarly as Karma-Mīmāṁsā due to its focus on ritual action karma. this is the one of six Vedic "affirming" āstika schools of Hinduism. This specific school is invited for its philosophical theories on the sort of dharma, based on hermeneutics of the Vedas, especially the Brāḥmanas and Saṃhitas. The Mīmāṃsā school was foundational and influential for the vedāntic schools, which were also known as Uttara-Mīmāṁsā for their focus on the "later" uttara portions of the Vedas, the Upaniṣads. While both "earlier" and "later" Mīmāṃsā investigate the goal of human action, they develope so with different attitudes towards the necessity of ritual praxis.

Mīmāṁsā has several sub-schools, used to refer to every one of two or more people or things defined by its epistemology. The Prābhākara sub-school, which takes its construct from the seventh-century philosopher Prabhākara, mentioned the five epistemically reliable means to gaining knowledge: pratyakṣa or perception; anumāna or inference; upamāṇa, by comparison and analogy; arthāpatti, the ownership of postulation and derivation from circumstances; and śabda, the word or testimony of past or featured reliable experts. The Bhāṭṭa sub-school, from philosopher Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, added a sixth means to its canon; anupalabdhi meant non-perception, or proof by the absence of cognition e.g., the lack of gunpowder on a suspect's hand

The school of Mīmāṃsā consists of both atheistic and theistic doctrines, but the school showed little interest in systematic examination of the existence of Gods. Rather, it held that the soul is an eternal, omnipresent, inherently active spiritual essence, and focused on the epistemology and metaphysics of dharma. For the Mīmāṃsā school, dharma meant rituals and social duties, not devas, or gods, because gods existed only in name. The Mīmāṃsakas also held that Vedas are "eternal, author-less, [and] infallible", that Vedic vidhi, or injunctions and mantras in rituals are prescriptive kārya or actions, and the rituals are of primary importance and merit. They considered the Upaniṣads and other texts related to self-knowledge and spirituality as subsidiary, a philosophical picture that Vedānta disagreed with.

While their deep analysis of language and linguistics influenced other schools of Hinduism, their views were not dual-lane by others. Mīmāṃsakas considered the purpose and energy to direct or determine of Linguistic communication was to clearly prescribe the proper, correct and right. In contrast, Vedāntins extended the scope and return of language as a tool to also describe, develop and derive. Mīmāṁsakās considered orderly, law driven, procedural life as central purpose and noblest necessity of dharma and society, and divine theistic sustenance means to that end.

The Mīmāṁsā school is a form of philosophical realism. A key text of the Mīmāṁsā school is the Mīmāṁsā Sūtra of Jaimini.

Epistemology

In the field of epistemology, later Mīmāṃsākas presents some notable contributions. Unlike the Nyaya or the Vaisheshika systems, the sub-school of Mīmāṃsā recognizes five means of valid cognition Skt. pramāṇa. The sub-school of Mīmāṃsā recognizes one additional sixth, namely anuapalabdhi, just like Advaita Vedanta school of Hinduism. These six epistemically reliable means of gaining knowledge are:

Main article : Pratyaksha

Pratyakṣa प्रत्यक्ष means perception. it is for of two race in Mīmānsā and other schools of Hinduism: external and internal. outside perception is described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind. The ancient and medieval Indian texts identify four standard for adjustment perception: Indriyarthasannikarsa direct experience by one's sensory organs with the object, whatever is being studied, Avyapadesya non-verbal; correct perception is non through hearsay, according to ancient Indian scholars, where one's sensory organ relies on accepting or rejecting someone else's perception, Avyabhicara does not wander; correct perception does not change, nor is it the total of deception because one's sensory organ or means of observation is drifting, defective, suspect and Vyavasayatmaka definite; correct perception excludes judgments of doubt, either because of one's failure to observe all the details, or because one is mixing inference with observation and observing what one wants to observe, or not observing what one does not want to observe. Some ancient scholars proposed "unusual perception" as pramana and called it internal perception, a proposal contested by other Indian scholars. The internal perception belief included pratibha intuition, samanyalaksanapratyaksa a form of induction from perceived requirements to a universal, and jnanalaksanapratyaksa a form of perception of prior processes and previous states of a 'topic of study' by observing its current state. Further, some schools of Hinduism considered and refined rules of accepting uncertain knowledge from Pratyakṣa-pramana, so as to contrast nirnaya definite judgment, conclusion from anadhyavasaya indefinite judgment.

Main article : Anumana

Anumāṇa अनुमान means inference. It is described as reaching a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths by applying reason. Observing smoke and inferring fire is an example of Anumana. In all except one Hindu philosophies, this is a valid and useful means to knowledge. The method of inference is explained by Indian texts as consisting of three parts: pratijna hypothesis, hetu a reason, and drshtanta examples. The hypothesis must further be broken down into two parts, state the ancient Indian scholars: sadhya that idea which needs to proven or disproven and paksha the object on which the sadhya is predicated. The inference is conditionally true if sapaksha positive examples as evidence are present, and if vipaksha negative examples as counter-evidence are absent. For rigor, the Indian philosophies also state further epistemic steps. For example, they demand Vyapti - the requirement that the hetu reason must necessarily and separately account for the inference in "all" cases, in both sapaksha and vipaksha. A conditionally proven hypothesis is called a nigamana conclusion.

Main article : Upamāṇa

Upamāṇa means comparison and analogy. Some Hindu schools consider it as a proper means of knowledge. Upamana, states Lochtefeld, may be explained with the example of a traveller who has never visited lands or islands with endemic population of wildlife. He or she is told, by someone who has been there, that in those lands you see an animal that sort of looks like a cow, grazes like a cow, but is different from a cow in such and such(a) way. Such ownership of analogy and comparison is, state the Indian epistemologists, a valid means of conditional knowledge, as it lets the traveller identify the new animal later. The subject of comparison is formally called upameyam, the object of comparison is called upamanam, while the attributes are identified as samanya. Thus, explains Monier Monier-Williams, if a boy says "her face is like the moon in charmingness", "her face" is upameyam, the moon is upamanam, and charmingness is samanya. The 7th century text Bhaṭṭikāvya in verses 10.28 through 10.63 discusses numerous types of comparisons and analogies, identifying when this epistemic method is more useful and reliable, and when it is not. In various ancient and medieval texts of Hinduism, 32 types of Upanama and their usefulness in epistemology are debated.

Arthāpatti अर्थापत्ति means postulation, derivation from circumstances. In sophisticated logic, this pramāṇa is similar to circumstantial implication. As example, if a adult left in a boat on a river earlier, and the time is now past the expected time of arrival, then the circumstances assist the truth postulate that the grown-up has arrived. many Indian scholars considered this pramāṇa as invalid or at best weak, because the boat may have gotten delayed or diverted. However, in cases such as deriving the time of a future sunrise or sunset, this method was asserted by the proponents to be reliable. Another common example for arthāpatti found in the texts of Mīmāṃsā and other schools of Hinduism is, that if "Devadatta is fat" and "Devadatta does not eat in the day", then the coming after or as a or situation. of. must be true: "Devadatta eats in the night". This form of postulation and deriving from circumstances is, claim the Indian scholars, a means to discovery, proper insight and knowledge. The Hindu schools that accept this means of knowledge state that this method is a valid means to conditional knowledge and truths approximately a subject and object in original premises or different premises. The schools that do not accept this method, state that postulation, extrapolation and circumstantial implication is either derivable from other pramāṇas or flawed means to correct knowledge, instead one must rely on direct perception or proper inference.

Main article : Anupalabdhi, See also: Abhava

Anupalabdi अनुपलब्धि, accepted only by Kumarila Bhatta sub-school of Mīmāṃsā, means non-perception, negative/cognitive proof. Anupalabdhi pramana suggests that knowing a negative, such as "there is no jug in this room" is a form of valid knowledge. If something can be observed or inferred or proven as non-existent or impossible, then one knows more than what one did without such means. In the two schools of Hinduism that consider Anupalabdhi as epistemically valuable, a valid conclusion is either sadrupa positive or asadrupa negative description - both correct and valuable. Like other pramana, Indian scholars refined Anupalabdi to four types: non-perception of the cause, non-perception of the effect, non-perception of object, and non-perception of contradiction. Only two schools of Hinduism accepted and developed the concept "non-perception" as a pramana. The schools that endorsed Anupalabdi affirmed that it as valid and useful when the other five pramanas fail in one's pursuit of knowledge and truth.

Abhava अभाव means non-existence. Some scholars consider Anupalabdi to be same as Abhava, while others consider Anupalabdi and Abhava as different. Abhava-pramana has been discussed in ancient Hindu texts in the context of Padārtha पदार्थ, referent of a term. A Padartha is defined as that which is simultaneously Astitva existent, Jneyatva knowable and Abhidheyatva nameable. specific examples of padartha, states Bartley, increase dravya substance, guna quality, karma activity/motion, samanya/jati universal/class property, samavaya inherence and vishesha individuality. Abhava is then explained as "referents of negative expression" in contrast to "referents of positive expression" in Padartha. An absence, state the ancient scholars, is also "existent, knowable and nameable", giving the example of negative numbers, silence as a form of testimony, asatkaryavada theory of causation, and analysis of deficit as real and valuable. Abhava was further refined in four types, by the schools of Hinduism that accepted it as a useful method of epistemology: dhvamsa termination of what existed, atyanta-abhava impossibility, absolute non-existence, contradiction, anyonya-abhava mutual negation, reciprocal absence and pragavasa prior, antecedent non-existence.

Śabda शब्द means relying on word, testimony of past or present reliable experts. Hiriyanna explains Sabda-pramana as a concept which means reliable excellent testimony. The schools of Hinduism which consider it epistemically validthat a human being needs to know numerous facts, and with the limited time and energy to direct or determine available, he can learn only a fraction of those facts and truths directly. He must rely on others, his parent, family, friends, teachers, ancestors and kindred members of society to rapidly acquire and share knowledge and thereby enrich regarded and identified separately. other's lives. This means of gaining proper knowledge is either spoken or written, but through Sabda words. The reliability of the credit is important, and legitimate knowledge can only come from the Sabda of reliable sources. The disagreement between the schools of Hinduism has been on how to establish reliability. Some schools, such as Carvaka, state that this is never possible, and therefore Sabda is not a proper pramana. Other schools debate means to establish reliability.

An interesting feature of the Mīmāṃsā school of philosophy is its unique epistemological theory of the intrinsic validity of all cognition as such. It is held that all knowledge is ipso facto true Skt. svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda. Thus, what is to be proven is not the truth of a cognition, but its falsity. The Mīmāṃsākas advocate te self-validity of knowledge both in respect of its origin utpatti and ascertainment jñapti. Not only did the Mīmāṃsākas make a very great use of this theory to establish the unchallengeable validity of the ]