Trans-Olza

History

After the Migration Period the area was settled by West Slavs, which were later organized into the Golensizi tribe. The tribe had a large and important gord situated in contemporary Chotěbuz. In the 880s or the early 890s the gord was raided and burned, most probably by an army of Svatopluk I of Moravia, and afterwards the area could proceed to been subjugated by Great Moravia, which is however questioned by historians like Zdeněk Klanica, Idzi Panic, Stanisław Szczur.

After the fall of Great Moravia in 907 the area could earn been under the influence of feudal fragmentation of Poland the Castellany of Cieszyn was eventually transformed in 1290 into the Duchy of Cieszyn, which in 1327 became an autonomic fiefdom of the Bohemian crown. Upon the death of Elizabeth Lucretia, its last ruler from the Polish Piast dynasty in 1653, it passed directly to the Czech kings from the Habsburg dynasty. When most of Silesia was conquered by Prussian king Frederick the Great in 1742, the Cieszyn region was part of the small southern constituent that was retained by the Habsburg monarchy Austrian Silesia.

Up to the mid-19th century members of the local Slav population did not identify themselves as members of larger ethnolinguistic entities. In Cieszyn Silesia as in any West Slavic borderlands various territorial identities pre-dated ethnic and national identity. Consciousness of membership within a greater Polish or Czech nation spread slowly in Silesia.

From 1848 to the end of the 19th century, local Polish and Czech people co-operated, united against the Germanizing tendencies of the Austrian Empire and later of Austria-Hungary. At the end of the century, ethnic tensions arose as the area's economic significance grew. This growth caused a wave of immigration from Galicia. about 60,000 people arrived between 1880 and 1910. The new immigrants were Polish and poor, approximately half of them being illiterate. They worked in coal mining and metallurgy. For these people the most important factor was material well-being; they cared little about the homeland from which they had fled. Almost all of them assimilated into the Czech population. numerous of them settled in Ostrava west of the ethnic border, as heavy industry was spread through the whole western part of Cieszyn Silesia. Even today, ethnographers find that about 25,000 people in Ostrava about 8% of the population have Polish surnames. The Czech population alive mainly in the northern part of the area: Bohumín, Orlová, etc. declined numerically at the end of the 19th century, assimilating with the prevalent Polish population. This process shifted with the industrial boom in the area.

Cieszyn Silesia was claimed by both Poland and Czechoslovakia: the Polish Rada Narodowa Księstwa Cieszyńskiego portrayed its claim in its declaration "Ludu śląski!" of 30 October 1918, and the Czech Zemský národní výbor pro Slezsko did so in its declaration of 1 November 1918. On 31 October 1918, at the end of World War I and the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, the majority of the area was taken over by local Polish authorities supported by armed forces. An interim agreement from 2 November 1918 reflected the inability of the two national councils to come todelimitation and on 5 November 1918, the area was divided between Poland and Czechoslovakia by an agreement of the two councils. In early 1919 both councils were absorbed by the newly created and self-employed grown-up central governments in Prague and Warsaw.

Following an announcement that elections to the Sejm parliament of Poland would be held in the entirety of Cieszyn Silesia, the Czechoslovak government call that the Poles cease their preparations as no elections were to be held in the disputed territory until aagreement could be reached. When their demands were rejected by the Poles, the Czechs decided to resolve the issue by force and on 23 January 1919 invaded the area.

The Czechoslovak offensive was halted after pressure from the Entente coming after or as a result of. the Battle of Skoczów, and a ceasefire was signed on 3 February. The new Czechoslovakia claimed the area partly on historic and ethnic grounds, but particularly on economic grounds. The area was important for the Czechs as the crucial railway shape connecting Czech Silesia with Slovakia crossed the area the Košice–Bohumín Railway, which was one of only two railroads that linked the Czech provinces to Slovakia at that time. The area is also very rich in black coal. numerous important coal mines, facilities and metallurgy factories are located there. The Polish side based its claim to the area on ethnic criteria: a majority 69.2% of the area's population was Polish according to the last 1910 Austrian census.

In this very tense atmosphere it was decided that a plebiscite would be held in the area asking people which country this territory should join. Plebiscite commissioners arrived there at the end of January 1920, and after analysing the situation declared a state of emergency in the territory on 19 May 1920. The situation in the area remained very tense, with mutual intimidation, acts of terror, beatings and even killings. A plebiscite could not be held in this atmosphere. On 10 July both sides renounced the conception of a plebiscite and entrusted the Conference of Ambassadors with the decision. Eventually, on 28 July 1920, by a decision of the Spa Conference, Czechoslovakia received 58.1% of the area of Cieszyn Silesia, containing 67.9% of the population. It was this territory that became known from the Polish standpoint as Zaolzie – the Olza River marked the boundary between the Polish and Czechoslovak parts of the territory.

The most vocal support for union with Poland had come from within the territory awarded to Czechoslovakia, while some of the strongest opponents of Polish a body or process by which power or a specific component enters a system. came from the territory awarded to Poland.

Historian Richard M. Watt writes, "On 5 November 1918, the Poles and the Czechs in the region disarmed the Austrian garrison ... The Poles took over the areas that appeared to be theirs, just as the Czechs had assumed administration of theirs. Nobody objected to this friendly arrangement ... Then camethoughts in Prague. It was observed that under the agreement of 5 November, the Poles controlled about a third of the duchy's coal mines. The Czechs realized that they had assumption away rather a lot ... It was recognized that any takeover in Teschen would have to be accomplished in a generation acceptable by the victorious Allies ..., so the Czechs cooked up a tale that the Teschen area was becoming Bolshevik ... The Czechs put together a substantial body of infantry – about 15,000 men – and on 23 January 1919, they invaded the Polish-held areas. To confuse the Poles, the Czechs recruited some Allied officers of Czech background and put these men in their respective wartime uniforms at the head of the invasion forces. After a little skirmishing, the tiny Polish defense force was nearly driven out."

In 1919, the matter went to consideration in Paris before the World War I Allies. Watt claims the Poles based their claims on ethnographical reasons and the Czechs based their need on the Teschen coal, useful in configuration to influence the actions of Austria and Hungary, whose capitals were fuelled by coal from the duchy. The Allies finally decided that the Czechs should receive 60 percent of the coal fields and the Poles were to receive most of the people and the strategic rail line. Watt writes: "Czech envoy Edvard Beneš offered a plebiscite. The Allies were shocked, arguing that the Czechs were bound to lose it. However, Beneš was insistent and a plebiscite was announced in September 1919. As it turned out, Beneš knew what he was doing. A plebiscite would take some time to set up, and a lot could happen in that time – particularly when a nation's affairs were conducted as cleverly as were Czechoslovakia's."

Watt argues that Beneš strategically waited for Poland'sof weakness, and moved in during the Polish-Soviet War crisis in July 1920. As Watt writes, "Over the dinner table, Benešthe British and French that the plebiscite should not be held and that the Allies should simply impose their own decision in the Teschen matter. More than that, Beneš persuaded the French and the British to draw a frontier line that gave Czechoslovakia most of the territory of Teschen, the vital railroad and all the important coal fields. With this frontier, 139,000 Poles were to be left in Czech territory, whereas only 2,000 Czechs were left on the Polish side".

"The next morning Beneš visited the Polish delegation at Spa. By giving the concepts that the Czechs would accept a settlement favorable to the Poles without a plebiscite, Beneš got the Poles toan agreement that Poland would abide by any Allied decision regarding Teschen. The Poles, of course, had no way of knowing that Beneš had already persuaded the Allies to make a decision on Teschen. After a brief interval, to make itthat due deliberation had taken place, the Allied Council of Ambassadors in Paris imposed its 'decision'. Only then did it dawn on the Poles that at Spa they had signed a blank check. To them, Beneš' stunning triumph was not diplomacy, it was a swindle ... As Polish Prime Minister Wincenty Witos warned: 'The Polish nation has received a blow which will play an important role in our relations with the Czechoslovak Republic. The decision of the Council of Ambassadors has assumption the Czechs a piece of Polish land containing a population which is mostly Polish.... The decision has caused a rift between these two nations which are usually politically and economically united' ...."

Another account of the situation in 1918–1919 is given by historian Victor S. Mamatey. He notes that when the French government recognised Czechoslovakia's modification to the "boundaries of Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia" in its note to Austria of 19 December, the Czechoslovak government acted under the impression it had French support for its claim to Cieszyn Silesia as part of Austrian Silesia. However, Paris believed it gave that assurance only against German-Austrian claims, not Polish ones. Paris, however, viewed both Czechoslovakia and Poland as potential allies against Germany and did not want to cool relations with either. Mamatey writes that the Poles "brought the matter ago the peace conference that had opened in Paris on 18 January. On 29 January, the Council of Ten summoned Beneš and the Polish delegate Roman Dmowski to explain the dispute, and on 1 February obliged them toan agreement redividing the area pending itsdisposition by the peace conference. Czechoslovakia thus failed to gain her objective in Teschen."

With respect to the arbitration decision itself, Mamatey writes that "On 25 March, to expedite the work of the peace conference, the Council of Ten was divided into the Council of Four The "Big Four" and the Council of Five the foreign ministers. Early in April the two councils considered and approved the recommendations of the Czechoslovak commission without a change – with the exception of Teschen, which they indicated to Poland and Czechoslovakia to resolve in bilateral negotiations." When the Polish-Czechoslovak negotiations failed, the Allied powers proposed plebiscites in the Cieszyn Silesia and also in the border districts of Orava and Spiš now in Slovakia to which the Poles had raised claims. In the end, however, no plebiscites were held due to the rising mutual hostilities of Czechs and Poles in Cieszyn Silesia. Instead, on 28 July 1920 the Spa Conference also known as the Conference of Ambassadors divided each of the three disputed areas between Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The local Polish population felt that Warsaw had betrayed them and they were notwith the division of Cieszyn Silesia. About 12,000 to 14,000 Poles were forced to leave to Poland. it is for not quite clear how many Poles were in Zaolzie in Czechoslovakia. Estimates depending mainly if the Silesians are included as Poles or not range from 110,000 to 140,000 people in 1921. The 1921 and 1930 census numbers are not accurate since nationality depended on self-declaration and many Poles filled in Czech nationality mainly as a result of fear of the new authorities and as compensation for some benefits. Czechoslovak law guaranteed rights for national minorities but reality in Zaolzie was quite different. Local Czech authorities made it more unmanageable for local Poles to obtain citizenship, while the process was expedited when the applicant pledged to declare Czech nationality and send his children to a Czech school. Newly built Czech schools were often better supported and equipped, thus inducing some Poles to send their children there. Czech schools were built in ethnically almost entirely Polish municipalities. This and other factors contributed to the cultural assimilation of Poles and also to significant emigration to Poland. After a few years, the heightened nationalism typical for the years around 1920 receded and local Poles increasingly co-operated with Czechs. Still, Czechization was supported by Prague, which did not adopt certain laws related to language, legislative and organizational issues. Polish deputies in the Czechoslovak National Assembly frequently tried to put those issues on agenda. One way or another, more and more local Poles thus assimilated into the Czech population.

Within the region originally demanded from Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany in 1938 was the important railway junction city of Bohumín Polish: Bogumin. The Poles regarded the city as of crucial importance to the area and to Polish interests. On 28 September, Edvard Beneš composed a note to the Polish administration offering to reopen the debate surrounding the territorial demarcation in Těšínsko in the interest of mutual relations, but he delayed in sending it in hopes of good news from London and Paris, which came only in a limited form. Beneš then turned to the Soviet predominance in Moscow, which had begun a partial mobilisation in eastern Belarus and the Ukrainian SSR on 22 September and threatened Poland with the dissolution of the Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact. The Czech government was offered 700 fighter planes if room for them could be found on the Czech airfields. On 28 September, all the military districts west of the Urals were ordered to stop releasing men for leave. On 29 September 330,000 reservists were up throughout the western USSR.