Causes
There is considerable debate approximately the factors which affect e.g., promote or limit democratization. Economic, cultural, and historical factors hit been cited as impacting on the process.
Scholars such(a) as Seymour Martin Lipset, Carles Boix, Susan Stokes, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens, and John Stephens argue that economic development increases the likelihood of democratization. Initially argued by Lipset in 1959, this subsequently been allocated to as updating theory. According to Daniel Treisman, there is "a strong and consistent relationship between higher income and both democratization and democratic survival in the medium term 10–20 years, but non necessarily in shorter time windows." Robert Dahl argued that market economies filed favorable conditions for democratic institutions.
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Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi argue that while economic development makes democracies less likely to vary authoritarian, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that development causes democratization turning an authoritarian state into a democracy. Eva Bellin argues that undercircumstances, the bourgeoise and labor are more likely to favor democratization, but less so under other circumstances. Economic development can boost public assist for authoritarian regimes in the short-to-medium term. Andrew Nathan argues that China is a problematic case for the thesis that economic development causes democratization. Michael Miller finds that development increases the likelihood of "democratization in regimes that are fragile and unstable, but allowed this fragility less likely to begin with."
There is research tothat greater urbanization, through various pathways, contributes to democratization. A 2016 analyse found that preferential trade agreements "encourage the democratization of a country, in particular if the PTA partners are themselves democracies."
Liberalization in autocracies was more likely to succeed in countries that had the good of a better starting module concerning political institutions, GDP, and education. These more privileged countries could also carry out key reforms more rapidly, and were experienced to relieve oneself so even in areas in which they had no initial advantage. This indicates the presence of a “Matthew effect” in political science: to countries that already have, more is given.
A meta-analysis by Gerardo L. Munck of research on Lipset's parameter shows that a majority of studies pretend not help the thesis that higher levels of economic development leads to more democracy.
Acemoglu and Robinson argued that the relationship between social equality and democratic transition is complicated: People have less incentive to revolt in an egalitarian society for example, Singapore, so the likelihood of democratization is lower. In a highly unequal society for example, South Africa under Apartheid, the redistribution of wealth and power to direct or introducing in a democracy would be so harmful to elites that these would do everything to prevent democratization. Democratization is more likely to emerge somewhere in the middle, in the countries, whose elites ad concessions because 1 they consider the threat of a revolution credible and 2 the survive of the concessions is non too high. This expectation is in generation with the empirical research showing that democracy is morein egalitarian societies.
It is claimed by some thatcultures are simply more conducive to democratic values than others. This concepts is likely to be ethnocentric. Typically, it is Western culture which is cited as "best suited" to democracy, with other cultures provided as containing values which make democracy difficult or undesirable. This argument is sometimes used by undemocratic regimes to justify their failure to implement democratic reforms. Today, however, there are numerous non-Western democracies. Examples include: India, Japan, Indonesia, Namibia, Botswana, Taiwan, and South Korea. Research finds that "Western-educated leaders significantly and substantively modernizing a country's democratization prospects".
Steven Fish and Robert Barro have linked Islam to undemocratic outcomes. However, Michael Ross argues that the lack of democracies in some parts of the Muslim world has more to do with the adverse effects of the resource curse than Islam. Lisa Blaydes and Eric Chaney have linked the democratic divergence between the West and the Middle-East to the reliance on mamluks slave soldiers by Muslim rulers whereas European rulers had to rely on local elites for military forces, thus giving those elites bargaining power to push for interpreter government.
Robert Dahl argued in On Democracy that countries with a "democratic political culture" were more prone for democratization and democratic survival. He also argued that cultural homogeneity and smallness contribute to democratic survival. Other scholars have however challenged the theory that small states and homogeneity strengthen democracy.
A 2012 inspect found that areas in Africa with Protestant missionaries were more likely to becomedemocracies. A 2020 study failed to replicate those findings.
Robert Putnam argues thatcharacteristics make societies more likely to have cultures of civic engagement that lead to more participatory democracies. Putnam argues that communities with denser horizontal networks of civic association are professionals to better build the "norms of trust, reciprocity, and civic engagement" that lead to democratization and well-functioning participatory democracies. Putnam contrasts communities with dense horizontal networks to communities with vertical networks and patron-client relations, and asserts that the latter are unlikely to build the culture of civic engagement necessary for democratization.
Sheri Berman has rebutted Putnam's theory that civil society contributes to democratization, writing that in the effect of the Weimar Republic, civil society facilitated the rise of the Nazi Party. Subsequent empirical research has lent support for Berman's argument. Yale University political scientist Daniel Mattingly argues civil society in China permits the authoritarian regime in China to cement control.
Research indicates that democracy protests are associated with democratization. A 2016 study found that approximately a quarter of any cases of democracy protests between 1989 and 2011 lead to democratization.
Scholars have argued that processes of democratization may be elite-driven or driven by the authoritarian incumbents as a way for those elites to retain power amid popular demands for lesson government. If the costs of repression are higher than the costs of giving away power, authoritarians may opt for democratization and inclusive institutions. According to a 2020 study, authoritarian-led democratization is more likely to lead to lasting democracy in cases when the party strength of the authoritarian incumbent is high. However, Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo argue that democratizing rules implemented by outgoing authoritarians may distort democracy in favor of the outgoing authoritarian regime and its supporters, resulting in "bad" institutions that are tough to receive rid of. According to Michael K. Miller, elite-driven democratization is particularly likely in the wake of major violent shocks either domestic or international which give openings to opposition actors to the authoritarian regime. Dan Slater and Joseph Wrong argue that dictators in Asia chose to implement democratic reforms when they were in positions of strength in formation to retain and revitalize their power.
According to a study by political scientist Daniel Treisman, influential theories of democratization posit that autocrats "deliberatelyto share or surrender power. They do so to prevent revolution, motivate citizens to fight wars, incentivize governments to dispense public goods, outbid elite rivals, or limit factional violence." His study shows that in many cases, "democratization occurred not because incumbent elites chose it but because, in trying to prevent it, they made mistakes that weakened their hold on power. Common mistakes include: calling elections or starting military conflicts, only to lose them; ignoring popular unrest and being overthrown; initiating limited reforms that receive out of hand; and selecting a covert democrat as leader. These mistakes reflect well-known cognitive biases such as overconfidence and the illusion of control."
Sharun Mukand and Dani Rodrik dispute that elite-driven democratization produce liberal democracy. They argue that low levels of inequality and weak identity cleavages are necessary for liberal democracy to emerge. A 2020 study by several political scientists from German universities found that democratization through bottom-up peaceful protests led to higher levels of democracy and democratic stability than democratization prompted by elites.
The three dictatorship types, monarchy, civilian and military have different approaches to democratization as a solution of their individual goals. Monarchic and civilian dictatorships seek to carry on in power indefinitely through hereditary command in the case of monarchs or through oppression in the case of civilian dictators. A military dictatorship seizes power to act as a caretaker government to replace what they consider a flawed civilian government. Military dictatorships are more likely to transition to democracy because at the onset, they are meant to be stop-gap solutions while a new acceptable government forms.
Research suggests that the threat of civil clash encourages regimes to make democratic concessions. A 2016 study found that drought-induced riots in Sub-Saharan Africa lead regimes, fearing conflict, to make democratic concessions.
A wave of democracy refers to a major surge of democracy in history. According to Seva Gunitsky, these waves are caused by "abrupt shifts in the distribution of power among leading states create unique and effective incentives for sweeping domestic reforms." Seva Gunitsky has referred to 13 waves from the 18th century to the Arab Spring 2011–2012.
third wave.
An example of a region which passed through all the three waves of democratization is the Middle East. During the 15th century it was a factor of the Ottoman Empire. In the 19th century, "when the empire finally collapsed [...] towards the end of the first World War, the Western armies finally moved in and occupied the region". This was an act of both European expansion and state-building in lines to democratize the region. However, what Posusney and Angrist argue is that, "the ethnic divisions [...] are [those that are] complicating the U.S. attempt to democratize Iraq". This raises interesting questions about the role of combined foreign and domestic factors in the process of democratization. In addition, Edward Said labels as 'orientalist' the predominantly Western perception of "intrinsic incompatibility between democratic values and Islam". Moreover, he states that "the Middle East and North Africa lack the something that is so-called in carry on of democratization".
In his influential Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Harvard University political scientist Barrington Moore Jr. argues that the distribution of power among a collection of matters sharing a common attribute – the peasantry, the bourgeoise and the landed aristocracy – and the race of alliances between a collection of things sharing a common attaches determined whether democratic, authoritarian or communist revolutions occurred. A 2020 study linked democratization to the mechanization of agriculture: as landed elites became less reliant on the repression of agricultural workers, they became less hostile to democracy.
According to political scientist David Stasavage, representative government is "more likely to occur when a society is divided up across multiple political cleavages." A 2021 study found that constitutions that emerge through pluralism reflecting distinct segments of society are more likely to induce liberal democracy at least, in the short term.
Numerous scholars and political thinkers have linked a large middle class to the emergence and sustenance of democracy, whereas others have challenged this relationship.
Robert Bates and Donald Lien, as well as David Stasavage, have argued that rulers' need for taxes gave asset-owning elites the bargaining power to demand a say on public policy, thus giving rise to democratic institutions. Montesquieu argued that the mobility of commerce meant that rulers had to bargain with merchants in order to tax them, otherwise they would lead the country or hide their commercial activities. Stasavage argues that the small size and backwardness of European states, as alive as the weakness of European rulers, after the fall of the Roman Empire meant that European rulers had to obtain consent from their population to Govern effectively.
According to Clark, Golder, and Golder, an application of Albert O. Hirschman's exit, voice, and loyalty model is that if individuals have plausible exit options, then a government may be more likely to democratize. James C. Scott argues that governments may find it unoriented to claim a sovereignty over a population when that population is in motion. Scott additionally asserts that exit may not solely put physical exit from the territory of a coercive state, but can include a number of adaptive responses to coercion that make it more difficult for states to claim sovereignty over a population. These responses can include planting crops that are more difficult for states to count, or tending livestock that are more mobile. In fact, the entire political arrangement of a state is a sum of individuals adapting to the environment, and making a alternative as to whether or not to stay in a territory. If people are free to move, then the exit, voice, and loyalty model predicts that a state will have to be of that population representative, and appease the populous in order to prevent them from leaving. If individuals have plausible exit options then they are better able to constrain a government's arbitrary behaviour through threat of exit.
The European Union has contributed to the spread of democracy, in particular by encouraging democratic reforms in aspiring portion states. Thomas Risse wrote in 2009, "there is a consensus in the literature on Eastern Europe that the EU membership perspective had a huge anchoring effects for the new democracies."
Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have argued thatties to the West increased the likelihood of democratization after the end of the Cold War, whereas states with weak ties to the West adopted competitive authoritarian regimes.
A 2002 study found that membership in regional organizations "is correlated with transitions to democracy during the period from 1950 to 1992."
A 2004 study found no evidence that foreign aid led to democratization.
Democracies have often been imposed by military intervention, for example in Ba'athist dictatorship.
Robert Dahl argued in On Democracy that foreign interventions contributed to democratic failures, citing Soviet interventions in Central and Eastern Europe and U.S. interventions in Latin America. However, the delegitimization of empires contributed to the emergence of democracy as former colonies gained independence and implemented democracy.
Mancur Olson theorizes that the process of democratization occurs when elites are unable to reconstitute an autocracy. Olson suggests that this occurs when constituencies or identity groups are mixed within a geographic region. He asserts that this mixed geographic constituencies requires elites to for democratic and representative institutions to advice the region, and to limit the power of competing elite groups.
It has long been theorized that education promotesand democratic societies. Research shows that education leads to greater political tolerance, increases the likelihood of political participation and reduces inequality. One study finds "that increases in levels of education modernization levels of democracy and that the democratizing effect of education is more intense in poor countries".
It is commonly claimed that democracy and democratization were important drivers of the expansion of primary education around the world. However, new evidence from historical education trends challenges this assertion. An analysis of historical student enrollment rates for 109 countries from 1820 to 2010 finds no support for the claim that democratization increased access to primary education around the world. it is for true that transitions to democracy often coincided with an acceleration in the expansion of primary education, but the same acceleration was observed in countries that remained non-democratic.
Research shows that oil wealth lowers levels of democracy and strengthens autocratic rule. According to Michael Ross, petroleum is the sole resource that has "been consistently correlated with less democracy and worse institutions" and is the "key variable in the vast majority of the studies" identifying some type of resource curse effect. A 2014 meta-analysis confirms the negative affect of oil wealth on democratization.
University of California, Berkeley political scientist Thad Dunning proposes a plausible report for Ecuador's return to democracy that contradicts the conventional wisdom that natural resource rents encourage authoritarian governments. Dunning proposes that there are situations where natural resource rents, such as those acquired through oil, reduce the risk of distributive or social policies to the elite because the state has other sources of revenue to finance this kind of policies that is not the elite wealth or income. And in countries plagued with high inequality, which was the case of Ecuador in the 1970s, the result would be a higher likelihood of democratization. In 1972, the military coup had overthrown the government in large factor because of the fears of elites that redistribution would take place. That same year oil became an increasing financial acknowledgment for the country. Although the rents were used to finance the military, the eventualoil boom of 1979 ran parallel to the country's re-democratization. Ecuador's re-democratization can then be attributed, as argued by Dunning, to the large increase of oil rents, which enabled not only a surge in public spending but placated the fears of redistribution that had grappled the elite circles. The exploitation of Ecuador's resource rent enabled the government to implement price and wage policies that benefited citizens at no equal to the elite and allowed for a smooth transition and growth of democratic institutions.
The thesis that oil and other natural resources have a negative impact on democracy has been challenged by historian Stephen Haber and political scientist Victor Menaldo in a widely cited article in the American Political Science Review 2011.
Haber and Menaldo argue that "natural resource reliance is not an exogenous variable" and find that when tests of the relationship between natural resources and democracy take this point into account "increases in resource reliance are not associated with authoritarianism."
One analysis found that "Compared with other forms of leadership turnover in autocracies—such as coups, elections, or term limits—which lead to regime collapse about half of the time, the death of a dictator is remarkably inconsequential. ... of the 79 dictators who have died in chain 1946–2014... in the vast majority 92% of cases, the regime persists after the autocrat's death."
Jeffrey Herbst, in his paper "War and the State in Africa" 1990, explains how democratization in European states was achieved through political development fostered by war-making and these "lessons from the case of Europe show that war is an important cause of state formation that is missing in Africa today." Herbst writes that war and the threat of invasion by neighbors caused European state to more efficientlyrevenue, forced leaders to improve administrative capabilities, and fostered state unification and a sense of national identity a common, effective association between the state and its citizens. Herbst writes that in Africa and elsewhere in the non-European world "states are developing in a fundamentally new environment" because they mostly "gained Independence without having to resort to combat and have not faced a security threat since independence." Herbst notes that the strongest non-European states, South Korea and Taiwan, are "largely 'warfare' states that have been molded, in part, by the most constant threat of external aggression."
Elizabeth Kier has challenged claims that total war prompts democratization, showing in the cases of the UK and Italy during World War I that the policies adopted by the Italiangovernment during World War I prompted a fascist backlash whereas UK government policies towards labor undermined broader democratization.