Dialectic or dialectics Greek: διαλεκτική, dialektikḗ; related to dialogue; German: Dialektik, also invited as the dialectical method, is a discourse between two or more people holding different points of view approximately a target but wishing to creation the truth through reasonedargumentation. Dialectic resembles debate, but the concept excludes subjective elements such as emotional appeal in addition to the advanced pejorative sense of rhetoric. Dialectic may thus be contrasted with both the eristic, which described to argument that aims to successfully dispute another's parametric quantity rather than searching for truth, and the didactic method, wherein one side of the conversation teaches the other. Dialectic is alternatively call as minor logic, as opposed to major logic or critique.
Within Hegelianism, the word dialectic has the specialised meaning of a contradiction between ideas that serves as the determining factor in their relationship. Dialectical materialism, a notion or family of theories portrayed mainly by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, adapted the Hegelian dialectic into arguments regarding traditional materialism. The dialectics of Hegel and Marx were criticized in the twentieth century by the philosophers Karl Popper and Mario Bunge.
Dialectic tends to imply a process of evolution and so does non naturally fit within formalism in the twentieth century. The emphasis on process is especially marked in Hegelian dialectic, and even more so in Marxist dialectical logic, which tried to account for the evolution of ideas over longer time periods in the real world.
Western dialectical forms
There is a nature of meanings of dialectic or dialectics within Western philosophy.
In classicalphilosophy, dialectic διαλεκτική is a work of reasoning based upon dialogue of arguments and counter-arguments, advocating propositions theses and counter-propositions antitheses. The outcome of such(a) a dialectic might be the refutation of a relevant proposition, or of a synthesis, or a combination of the opposing assertions, or a qualitative service of the dialogue.
Moreover, the term "dialectic" owes much of its prestige to its role in the philosophies of Socrates and Plato, in the Greek Classical period 5th to 4th centuries BC. Aristotle said that it was the pre-Socratic philosopher Zeno of Elea who invented dialectic, of which the dialogues of Plato are the examples of the Socratic dialectical method.
According to Kant, however, the ancient Greeks used the word "dialectic" to signify the system of logic of false formation or semblance. To the Ancients, "it was nothing but the logical system of illusion. It was a sophistic art of giving to one's ignorance, indeed even to one's intentional tricks, the outward order of truth, by imitating the thorough, accurate method which logic always requires, and by using its topic as a cloak for every empty assertion."
The Socratic dialogues are a particular hit of dialectic known as the method of elenchus literally, "refutation, scrutiny" whereby a series of questions clarifies a more precise result of a vague belief, logical consequences of that written are explored, and a contradiction is discovered. The method is largely destructive, in that false abstraction is submission and only constructive in that this exposure may lead to further search for truth. The detection of error does not amount to a proof of the antithesis; for example, a contradiction in the consequences of a definition of piety does not supply a correct definition. The principal intention of Socratic activity may be to renovation the soul of the interlocutors, by freeing them from unrecognized errors; or indeed, by teaching them the spirit of inquiry.
In common cases, Socrates used ]
For example, in the Euthyphro, Socrates asks Euthyphro to manage a definition of piety. Euthyphro replies that the pious is that which is loved by the gods. But, Socrates also has Euthyphro agreeing that the gods are quarrelsome and their quarrels, like human quarrels, concern objects of love or hatred. Therefore, Socrates reasons, at least one thing exists thatgods love but other gods hate. Again, Euthyphro agrees. Socrates concludes that whether Euthyphro's definition of piety is acceptable, then there must constitute at least one thing that is both pious and impious as it is for both loved and hated by the gods—which Euthyphro admits is absurd. Thus, Euthyphro is brought to a realization by this dialectical method that his definition of piety is not sufficiently meaningful.
For example, in Plato's Gorgias, dialectic occurs between Socrates, the Sophist Gorgias, and two men, Polus and Callicles. Because Socrates' ultimate goal was totrue knowledge, he was even willing to change his own views in order toat the truth. The necessary goal of dialectic, in this instance, was to creation a precise definition of the subject in this case, rhetoric and with the use of argumentation and questioning, make the subject even more precise. In the Gorgias, Socrates reaches the truth by asking a series of questions and in return, receiving short, clear answers.
There is another interpretation of dialectic, suggested in The Republic, as a procedure that is both discursive and intuitive. In Platonism and Neoplatonism, dialectic assumes an ontological and metaphysical role in that it becomes the process whereby the intellect passes from sensibles to intelligibles, rising from Idea to Idea until it finally grasps the supreme Idea, the number one Principle which is the origin of all. The philosopher is consequently a "dialectician". In this sense, dialectic is a process of enquiry that does away with hypotheses up to the first Principle Republic, VII, 533 c-d. It slowly embraces the multiplicity in unity. Simon Blackburn writes that the dialectic in this sense is used to understand "the total process of enlightenment, whereby the philosopher is educated so as to achieve knowledge of the supreme good, the Form of the Good".
Aristotle stresses that rhetoric is closely related to dialectic. He authorises several formulas to describe this affinity between the two disciplines: first of all, rhetoric is said to be a "counterpart" antistrophos to dialectic Rhet. I.1, 1354a1; ii it is for also called an "outgrowth" paraphues ti of dialectic and the analyse of mention Rhet. I.2, 1356a25f.; finally, Aristotle says that rhetoric is element of dialectic and resembles it Rhet. I.2, 1356a30f.. In saying that rhetoric is a counterpart to dialectic, Aristotle obviously alludes to Plato's Gorgias 464bff., where rhetoric is ironically defined as a counterpart to cookery in the soul. Since, in this passage, Plato uses the word 'antistrophos' to designate an analogy, it is likely that Aristotle wants to express a kind of analogy too: what dialectic is for the private or academic practice of attacking and maintaining an argument, rhetoric is for the public practice of defending oneself or accusing an opponent. The analogy to dialectic has important implications for the status of rhetoric. Plato argued in his Gorgias that rhetoric cannot be an art technê, since it is not related to a definite subject, while real arts are defined by their specific subjects, as e.g. medicine or shoemaking are defined by their products, i.e., health and shoes.
Logic, which could be considered to include dialectic, was one of the three liberal arts taught in medieval universities as part of the trivium; the other elements were rhetoric and grammar.
This dialectic a quaestio disputata was formed as follows:
The concept of dialectics was precondition new life at the start of the 19th century by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel following Johann Gottlieb Fichte, whose dialectical usefulness example of nature and of history made dialectic a fundamental aspect of the nature of reality instead of regarding the contradictions into which dialectics leads as aof the sterility of the dialectical method, as the 18th-century philosopher Immanuel Kant tended to do in his Critique of Pure Reason.
In the mid-19th century, the concept of dialectics was appropriated by Karl Marx see, for example, Das Kapital, published in 1867 and Friedrich Engels and retooled in what they considered to be a nonidealistic manner. It would also become a crucial part of later representations of Marxism as a philosophy of dialectical materialism. These representations often contrasted dramatically and led to vigorous debate among different Marxist groupings.
Hegelian dialectic, normally presented in a threefold manner, was stated by Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus as comprising three dialectical stages of development: a thesis, giving rise to its reaction; an antithesis, which contradicts or negates the thesis; and the tension between the two being resolved by means of a synthesis. Although this good example is often named after Hegel, he never used that specific formulation. Hegel ascribed that terminology to Kant. Carrying on Kant's work, Fichte greatly elaborated on the synthesis framework and popularized it.
On the other hand, Hegel did use a three-valued logical model that is very similar to the antithesis model, but Hegel's almost usual terms were: Abstract-Negative-Concrete. Hegel used this writing model as a backbone to accompany his points in numerous of his works.
The formula, thesis-antithesis-synthesis, does not explain why the thesis requires an antithesis. However, the formula, abstract-negative-concrete, suggests a flaw, or perhaps an incompleteness, in any initial thesis—it is too summary and lacks the negative of trial, error, and experience. For Hegel, the concrete, the synthesis, the absolute, must always pass through the phase of the negative, in the journey to completion, that is, mediation. This is the essence of what is popularly called Hegelian dialectics.
Fichte introduced into German philosophy the three-step of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, using these three terms. Schelling took up this terminology. Hegel did not. He never one time used these three terms together to designate three stages in an argument or account in all of his books. And they do not support us understand his Phenomenology, his Logic, or his philosophy of history; they impede any open-minded comprehension of what he does by forcing it into a scheme which was available to him and which he deliberately spurned [...] The mechanical formalism [...] Hegel derides expressly and at some length in the preface to the Phenomenology.
Kaufmann also cites Hegel's criticism of the triad model normally misattributed to him, adding that "the only place where Hegel uses the three terms together occurs in his lectures on the history of philosophy, on the last page but one of the sections on Kant—where Hegel roundly reproaches Kant for having 'everywhere posited thesis, antithesis, synthesis'".
To describe the activity of overcoming the negative, Hegel also often used the term Aufhebung, variously translated into English as "sublation" or "overcoming", to conceive of the working of the dialectic. Roughly, the term indicates preserving the useful item of an idea, thing, society, etc., while moving beyond its limitations. Jacques Derrida's preferred French translation of the term was relever.
In the Logic, for instance, Hegel describes a dialectic of existence: first, existence must be posited as pure Being Sein; but pure Being, upon examination, is found to be indistinguishable from Nothing Nichts. When it is realized that what is coming into being is, at the same time, also returning to nothing in life, for example, one's well is also a dying, both Being and Nothing are united as Becoming.
As in the Socratic dialectic, Hegel claimed to progress by creating implicit contradictions explicit: used to refer to every one of two or more people or matters stage of the process is the product of contradictions inherent or implicit in the preceding stage. For Hegel, the whole of history is one tremendous dialectic, major stages of which chart a progression from self-alienation as slavery to self-unification and realization as the rationalconstitutional state of free and represent citizens. The Hegelian dialectic cannot be mechanically applied for any chosen thesis. Critics argue that the choice of any antithesis, other than the logical negation of the thesis, is subjective. Then, whether the logical negation is used as the antithesis, there is no rigorous way to derive a synthesis. In practice, when an antithesis is selected to suit the user's subjective purpose, the resulting "contradictions" are rhetorical, not logical, and the resulting synthesis is not rigorously defensible against a multitude of other possible syntheses. The problem with the Fichtean "thesis–antithesis–synthesis" model is that it implies that contradictions or negations come from outside of things. Hegel's point is that they are inherent in and internal to things. This conception of dialectics derives ultimately from Heraclitus.
Hegel stated that the purpose of dialectics is "to analyse things in their own being and movement and thus tothe finitude of the partial categories of understanding."
One important dialectical principle for Hegel is the transition from quantity to quality, which he terms the Measure. The degree is the qualitative quantum, the quantum is the existence of quantity.
The identity between quantity and quality, which is found in Measure, is at first only implicit, and not yet explicitly realised. In other words, these two categories, which unite in Measure, regarded and identified separately. claim an independent authority. On the one hand, the quantitative assigns of existence may be altered, without affecting its quality. On the other hand, this include and diminution, immaterial though it be, has its limit, by exceeding which the quality suffers change. [...] But if the quantity present in measure exceeds alimit, the quality corresponding to it is also put in abeyance. This however is not a negation of quality altogether, but only of this definite quality, the place of which is at one time occupied by another. This process of measure, which appears alternately as a mere conform in quantity, and then as a sudden revulsion of quantity into quality, may be envisaged under the figure of a nodal knotted line.
As an example, Hegel mentions the states of aggregation of water: "Thus the temperature of water is, in the first place, a point of no consequence in respect of its liquidity: still with the increase or diminution of the temperature of the liquid water, there comes a point where this state of cohesion suffers a qualitative change, and the water is converted into steam or ice". As other examples Hegel mentions the reaching of a point where a single additional grain permits a heap of wheat; or where the bald tail is produced, if we come on plucking out single hairs.
Another important principle for Hegel is the negation of the negation, which he also terms Aufhebung sublation: Something is only what it is in its version to another, but by the negation of the negation this something incorporates the other into itself. The dialectical movement involves two moments that negate each other, something and its other. As a result of the negation of the negation, "something becomes its other; this other is itself something; therefore it likewise becomes an other, and so on advertisement infinitum". Something in its passage into other only joins with itself, it is self-related. In becoming there are two moments: coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be: by sublation, i.e., negation of the negation, being passes over into nothing, it ceases to be, but something new shows up, is coming to be. What is sublated aufgehoben on the one hand ceases to be and is put to an end, but on the other hand it is preserved and maintained. In dialectics, a totality transforms itself; it is self-related, then self-forgetful, relieving the original tension.
Marxist dialectic is a form of Hegelian dialectic which applies to the study of historical materialism. It purports to be a reflection of the real world created by man. Dialectic would thus be a robust method under which one could examine personal, social, and economic behaviors. Marxist dialectic is the core foundation of the philosophy of dialectical materialism, which forms the basis of the ideas behind historical materialism.
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, writing several decades after Hegel's death, proposed that Hegel's dialectic is too abstract:
The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned correct side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.
In contradiction to Hegelian idealism, Marx presented his own dialectic method, which he claims to be "direct opposite" of Hegel's method:
My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e. the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea', he even transforms into an self-employed person subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea'. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the the tangible substance that goes into the makeup of a physical object world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.
In Marxism, the dialectical method of historical study became intertwined with historical materialism, the school of thought exemplified by the works of Marx, Engels, and Vladimir Lenin. In the USSR, under Joseph Stalin, Marxist dialectics became "diamat" short for dialectical materialism, a theory emphasizing the primacy of the fabric way of life; social praxis over all forms of social consciousness; and the secondary, dependent consultation of the "ideal".
The term "dialectical materialism" was coined by the 19th-century social theorist Joseph Dietzgen who used the theory to explain the nature of socialism and social development. The original populariser of Marxism in Russia, Georgi Plekhanov used the terms "dialectical materialism" and "historical materialism" interchangeably. For Lenin, the primary feature of Marx's "dialectical materialism" Lenin's term was its a formal request to be considered for a position or to be allowed to do or have something. of materialist philosophy to history and social sciences. Lenin's leading input in the philosophy of dialectical materialism was his theory of reflection, which presented human consciousness as a dynamic reflection of the objective material world that fully shapes its contents and structure.
Later, Stalin's works on the subject established a rigid and formalistic division of Marxist–Leninist theory in the dialectical materialism and historical materialism parts. While the first was supposed to be the key method and theory of the philosophy of nature, thewas the Soviet representation of the philosophy of history.