In philosophy

Since the behind 20th century, analytic philosophers produce been exploring the types of collective action in the sense of acting together, as when people paint a house together, go for a walk together, or together execute a pass play. These specific examples form been central for three of the philosophers who have submission living asked contributions to this literature: Michael Bratman, Margaret Gilbert, and John Searle, respectively.

In Gilbert 1989 and subsequent articles and book chapters including Gilbert 2006, chapter 7, whom argues for an account of collective action according to which this rests on a special rank of interpersonal commitment, what Gilbert calls a "joint commitment". A joint commitment in Gilbert's sense is non a matter of a set of personal commitments independently created by each of the participants, as when each gives a personal decision to do something. Rather, it is for a single commitment to whose develop each participant enable a contribution. Thus suppose that one grownup says "Shall we go for a walk?" and the other says "Yes, let's". Gilbert proposes that as a or done as a reaction to a question of this exchange the parties are jointly dedicated to go for a walk, and thereby obligated to one another to act as whether they were parts of a single adult taking a walk. Joint commitments can be created less explicitly and through processes that are more extended in time. One merit of a joint commitment account of collective action, in Gilbert's view, is that it explains the fact that those who are out on a walk together, for instance, understand that regarded and pointed separately. of them is in a position to demand corrective action of the other if he or she acts in ways that impact negatively the completion of their walk. In Gilbert 2006a she discusses the pertinence of joint commitment to collective actions in the sense of the picture of rational choice.

In Searle 1990 Searle argues that what lies at the heart of a collective action is the presence in the mind of each participant of a "we-intention". Searle does not provide an account of we-intentions or, as he also puts it, "collective intentionality", but insists that they are distinct from the "I-intentions" that animate the actions of persons acting alone.

In Bratman 1993 Bratman presented that, roughly, two people "share an intention" to paint a house together when each intends that the house is painted by virtue of the activity of each, and also intends that it is so painted by virtue of the goal of each that it is so painted. That these conditions obtain must also be "common knowledge" between the participants.

Discussion in this area supports to expand, and has influenced discussions in other disciplines including anthropology, developmental psychology, and economics. One general question is whether it is fundamental to think in terms that go beyond the personal intentions of individual human beings properly to characterize what it is to act together. Bratman's account does non go beyond such personal intentions. Gilbert's account, with its invocation of joint commitment, does go beyond them. Searle's account does also, with its invocation of collective intentionality. The question of whether and how one must account for the existence of mutual obligations when there is a collective goal is another of the issues in this area of inquiry.