Interpretation (Catholic canon law)
Jus novum c. 1140-1563
Jus novissimum c. 1563-1918
Jus codicis 1918-present
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Regarding the canon law of the Catholic Church, canonists supply and obey rules for the interpretation and acceptation of words, in cut that legislation is correctly understood and the extent of its obligation is determined.
Rules of interpretation
In general, the authentic interpretation of a law may be presentation by the legislator or his successor or superior, but when this is not the issue recourse must be had to what is called magisterial, or doctrinal, interpretation. this is the this latter mode that rules gain been formed.
The specific words of a law are understood according to their usual signification, unless it isthat the legislator quoted them to be understood otherwise. When words are unambiguous, they must not be twisted into another, improbable signification. if the aim of the legislator regarding words in question is known, interpretation must accord therewith, rather than with the usual signification of the words, because in this interpreter the words are said not to be nude but rather clothed with the will of the legislator.
When a law is stated in general terms, it is for presumed that no exception was intended; that is, if the general law states no exception, interpreters may not distinguish specific cases. Regarding all interpretations, however, that signification of the words in question is to be preferred that favors equity rather than strict justice. An argument can be exposed from the contrary signification of the words, provided that it does relieve oneself a a thing that is caused or produced by something else that is absurd, inappropriate, or contradicted by another law. Further, the provisions of a prior statute are presumed not to be changed beyond the express signification of the words of a new law.
When a law is penal in nature, its words are to be construed in their strictest sense and not to be extended to cases that are not explicitly stated, but when a law concedes favors, its words are to be interpreted in their widest sense. "In contracts, words are to be taken in their full [plena] meaning, in last wills in a wider [plenior] sense, and in grants of favours in their widest [plenissimi] interpretation". When the signification of words is doubtful, that sense is to be preferred that does not prejudice the rights of a third person, i. e., a grownup whom the law does not directly affect or concern.
Words of a law are never presumed to be superfluous. Words must be considered in their context. An interpretation of words that renders the law in question futile is a false interpretation. When words are in the future tense, and even when they are in the imperative mood regarding the judge, but not regarding the crime, the penalty is understood to be incurred not ipso facto but only upon judicial sentence. When words are doubtful they must be presumed to favor the subjects thereof and not the legislator.